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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the authors review the FAA’s current program investments and lay out 
a preliminary analytical framework to undertake projects that may address some of 
the noted deficiencies. By drawing upon the well developed theories from corporate 
finance, an analytical framework is offered that can be used for choosing FAA’s 
investments taking into account risk, expected returns and inherent dependencies 
across NAS programs. The framework can be expanded into taking multiple assets 
and realistic values for parameters in drawing an efficient risk-return frontier for the 
entire FAA investment programs.  
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INTRODUCTION1 
The United States’ National Airspace System (NAS) contains a network 
of air transportation markets linking 485 commercial airports located in and 
around 363 metropolitan statistical areas. The total number of origin-
destination markets in the NAS ranges somewhere between 36,000-40,000 
pairs depending upon seasons and economic cycles. There are 315 air traffic 
control (ATC) facilities that are used to serve these markets meeting the 
daily travel needs of around 1.5 million passengers. Every day, roughly 
40,000 scheduled commercial departures and 13,000 high end2 general 
aviation (GA) departures fly in the same controlled airspace. Other GA 
traffic flying under visual flight rules — perhaps as many as 60,000 
departures per day — use terminal facilities services at both commercial and 
non-commercial airports. In addition, there are military flights that also 
require terminal and enroute services. This expansive network renders an 
estimated annual commercial value of around US $70-110 billion for 
scheduled GA services and around US $25-40 billion for unscheduled GA 
services and an undetermined amount from other services including military 
(President’s Aerospace Commission Report, 2003).  
Maintaining this network is expensive. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) spends over US $14 billion annually to fund facilities 
and equipment (F&E: approx. US $3B), operations (approx. US $7B), 
airports (approx. US $3B), and research and engineering (approx. US $0.2B) 
expenditures. The FAA’s NAS modernization program, the impetus behind 
F&E funding, consists of three elements: the NAS Architecture Plan (i.e., the 
engineering blueprint);3 the Capital Investment Plan (CIP);4 and the 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 5th Annual Aviation, 
Technology, Integration, and Operation of the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (ATIO/AIAA) conference at Crystal City, VA, Sept. 26-28, 2005. The 
authors would like to thank those who participated and for their suggestions. They 
would also like to thank their colleagues, Joseph Sinnott, E. J. Spear, Michele 
Steinbach, Felipe Moreno-Hines, Debby Pool, Dr. Katherine Harback and Dr. Bill 
Kuhn, whose comments and suggestions improved the focus of this research.  
2 Turbo fan and turbo prop aircraft flying under instrument flight rules. 
3 This is the comprehensive plan for modernizing the NAS. The plan covers 
information about architecture concepts, capabilities and plans for development in the 
future. 
4 The CIP is a 5-year plan that provides details on NAS projects that can be funded 
within the Office of Management and Budget’s future year targets, presently set for 
2006-2010. Through the CIP, the FAA fulfills public law obligations (PL 108-447) 
under which the Agency is “to transmit to the Congress a comprehensive capital 
investment plan for the Federal Aviation Administration which includes funding for 
each budget line item for fiscal years 2006 through 2010, with total funding for each 
year of the plan constrained to the funding targets for those years as estimated and 
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Operational Evolution Plan (OEP).5  The FAA has six goals which are the 
primary focus of their CIP investing strategy: 
1. Maintain a high level of safety;  
2. Enhance greater mobility throughout the NAS;  
3. Promote economic growth;  
4. Promote harmony with human and natural environment;  
5. Attain a high degree of national security; and  
6. Maintain organizational excellence (FAA Flight Plans, 2006).  
At present, there are 190 identified programs in the CIP, rolled up into 
90 investment programs, designed to serve these broad 6 goals 
Currently, CIP programs are evaluated on their individual merits where 
cost-benefit ratios, net present values, and internal rates of return reflect 
program effectiveness in meeting the stated FAA goals. While program cost 
estimates are relatively straight forward, benefits (total benefits) are often 
hard to quantify. Typically, a mixture of federal cost savings (e.g., higher 
productivity gains from investments in labor-saving technology) and external 
social benefits (e.g., better movement of aircraft at the congested airports 
thus reducing congestion), wherever applicable, are estimated to calculate 
the net present value of these investments. A combination of Treasury note 
interest rates (for federal government cost savings) and a real discount rate of 
7% (for external social benefits) have been recommended by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to evaluate the associated project 
investments (OMB, 2005).6  This evaluation criteria and process is fairly 
common throughout government programs. The A-94 also indicates that 
“benefit-cost or cost-effectiveness analyses should include comprehensive 
estimates of the expected benefits and costs to society.” Furthermore, 
“possible interactions between the benefits and costs being analyzed and 
other government activities should be considered.” [see OMB (2005) Section 
6; emphasis added].  
                                                                                                        
approved by the Office of Management and Budget”. See http://www.faa.gov/asd/ for 
more details on both the Architecture Plan and CIP. 
5 The OEP is the FAA's 10-year rolling plan to increase both the capacity and 
efficiency of the NAS while enhancing safety and security. For more details on OEP, 
see http://www.gov/programs/oep/index.htm 
6 The OMB publishes annual discount rates for calculating benefit-cost analysis of 
federal programs titled “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis for 
Federal Programs”, or what is commonly known as OMB Circular A-94 (see 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb for more details). 
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The FAA’s current investment analysis (IA) framework/process7 
determines program value and suitability by evaluating performance, 
lifecycle costs, benefits, program-specific risk, schedule, affordability and 
compatibility with the overall system architecture for a particular program. 
This approach is, however, somewhat limited when it comes to incorporating 
financial and other forms of programmatic interdependencies. The need to 
fill this gap, that is, the lack of apparent reconciliation between the 
requirements of system-wide architecture and that of financial requirements, 
has become even more urgent (GAO, 2005; FAA, 2005) and points to the 
direction of a “comprehensive strategy for modernizing the NAS (so that) 
…major acquisitions are delivered within cost, schedule, and performance 
milestones” (FAA, 2005, p. 3)  
This need leads one to seek alternative methodologies that tie 
investment programs with potential economies of scope, and benefit that 
arise from interdependencies among programs. The goal of the engineering 
architecture and its associated investments is to improve the flow of aircraft 
in a safe manner that eventually generates economic value in the system. 
Commercial aviation interests and fiduciary obligations required of the FAA 
call for system wide financial optimization built alongside the engineering 
architectural requirements.8 Broadening the investment evaluation 
framework may also add new dimensions to understanding true values 
inherent in the NAS, efficient programs leading to modernization of the 
                                                 
7 This was primarily led, until recently, by the Office of System Architecture and 
Investment Analysis, commonly known as ASD-400. After the Air Traffic 
Organization [ATO; see http://www.ato.faa.gov/ for more details] was formed, ASD 
transitioned into the ATO’s Offices of Systems Engineering, Business, Planning and 
Development, and International (SE BP&D, and International). The Public Law 106-
181 (AIR-21) that was passed in April 2000 authorized the FAA to create a Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) position who would be responsible for overseeing day-to-
day traffic control operations, undertaking initiatives to modernize air traffic control 
(ATC) systems, increasing productivity and implementing cost-saving measures, 
among other things. In December 2000, the President issued the Executive Order 
13180 that authorized the creation of the ATO, headed by the COO (GAO, 2005). 
The new office leads NAS architecture, system engineering, investment analysis and 
operations research. The ATO was created in February 2004 by combining FAA’s 
Research and Acquisitions, Air Traffic Services, and Free Flight Offices into one 
performance-based organization. 
8 The SE BP&D and International of the ATO leads the effort for the investment 
analysis process and is responsible for formulating investment analysis teams (IATs). 
By evaluating alternative investment strategies from a broader perspective, these 
IATs are responsible for putting together investment analysis report and 
recommendations that are then presented to the Joint Resources Council for the final 
investment decision. For a selective list of these analyses, see 
http://www.faa.gov/asd/ia-or/ia-reports.htm. 
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NAS, and interdependencies across programs. Indeed, the ultimate outcome 
from applying this methodology is to invest in the optimum set of programs, 
which have embedded interdependencies that maximize return and minimize 
risk.  
FAA investment selection criteria, as with most government investment, 
require special consideration due to the lack of market signals. In the 
business world, good investments differentiate themselves from bad 
investments through measures of return. Markets match consumers with 
products and services. Bad investments that fail to produce sufficient returns 
are weeded from the portfolio. FAA investment occurs outside of a market. 
There are no alternative air traffic service providers with a different portfolio 
of investments from which consumers can buy air traffic services thus 
providing market value signals. For this reason other means must be used to 
measure the value of investments. 
In pursuit of a more comprehensive investment strategy we draw upon 
the literature of financial economics (Bodie et al., 1996; Ross et al., 1999) 
and offer a portfolio investment framework that is well specified to account 
for program interdependencies across cost, benefit and risk sharing and 
accommodate the surrogate market requirements. A Markowitz efficient 
frontier of risk and return has been built to facilitate the selection of sets of 
optimal programs within the scope of the FAA’s programmatic engineering 
requirements. Using this framework and applying it to a set of hypothetical 
program costs, returns and interdependencies, we attempt to demonstrate that 
choices resulting from how portfolio analysis may provide useful 
information for optimizing a financial portfolio specified over risks and 
returns, as opposed to traditionally optimized individual programs. 
The paper is organized along the following lines: the next section 
discusses the structure of the present FAA investments. The third section 
provides the analytical framework of an experimental approach laying out 
the empirical underpinnings. The fourth section provides an example of 
some hypothetical experiments and discusses implications on program 
implementation. The final section provides conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
BACKGROUND 
The FAA’s reauthorization plan, called the AIR-21, aligns the NAS 
architecture and the CIP with the OMB’s five-year budget planning process. 
The majority of AIR-21 funding was earmarked to improve RADAR 
modernization and airport construction projects. Under the AIR-21, the total 
authorized funding for federal aviation programs, starting in 2000, was $40 
billion over three years. An estimated $33 billion was guaranteed from the 
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Aviation Trust Fund, while the remaining $6.7 billion was to be drawn from 
the General Fund.  
Figure 1 provides a broad overview of the allocation of budgetary 
resources under AIR-21 during the period 2000-2003. Of the total 2003 
annual expenditure of $14 billion, operations consumed the largest share 
(52%) followed by airport improvement project (AIP) (25%) and F&E 
(21%). It is interesting to note that since 2001 expenditures for operations 
have experienced a relatively faster growth rate compared to all other broad 
expenditures including research, engineering and development (RE&D). 
 
Figure 1: Allocations of funds under AIR-21, 2000-2003 
 
 
Source: Capital Investment Plan (CIP)/FAA (2004); See www.faa.gov/asd/ for more details. 
At present, there are 485 tower facilities (118 of them are towers with 
RADAR coverage), 185 terminal radar approach control (TRACON) 
facilities and 21 enroute centers within the continental US (20 in the 
contiguous US and 1 in Anchorage). In addition, there are five oceanic 
centers that handle incoming and outgoing traffic beyond the contiguous 
territories of the US. There are a little over 7,000 air traffic controllers 
directly associated with terminal facilities, while the rest, around 7,450 are 
assigned to enroute traffic, both TRACON and enroute.  
The FAA uses standard performance measures to establish the 
suitability and effectiveness of its programs. Generally speaking, programs 
are designed to support five broad categories: safety, efficiency of ATC, 
capacity of the NAS, reliability of the NAS, and effectiveness of mission 
AIR 21 Allocations of Funds
0 
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f U
S 
$
Operations 
AIP 
Facilities & Equipment
Research, Engg. & Dev.
 Bhadra and Morser 9 
 
 
support. In order to track these more systematically, the FAA collects data 
on aspects of these categories: average minutes late per flight, percent of 
flights on time, ground stop minutes, average daily arrival capacity, average 
daily flights, airport efficiency rate, airport capacity in visual meteorological 
conditions, airport departure rate, airport arrival rate, airport capacity in 
instrument meteorological conditions, and airport instrument meteorological 
conditions index, and other statistics relating to safety.  
 
Figure 2: Allotment of funds for FAA programs, FY 2004-2008 
 
 
Source: FAA (2005, May 26). “Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions: Cost Growth and Schedule 
Delays Continue to Stall Air Traffic Modernization,” Report No. AV-2005-061. Washington 
DC: Office of the Inspector General, Federal Aviation Administration. 
 
A look at the total expenses and program allocations over the five years 
from FY2004-2008 indicates that the FAA’s portfolio of programs are 
distributed with a major focus on improving the operational efficiencies of 
the NAS. This focus in programmatic choice is reflected by the FAA’s 
expenditures over time as well (see Figures 2 and 3).  
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Figure 3: FAA program investments over time, FY2004-2008 
 
Source: CIP/FAA (2004); see www.faa.gov/asd/ for more details. 
 
Congressional inquiries (GAO, 2005), an Inspector General (IG) report 
(FAA, 2005) and independent reviews (Shantz & Hampton, 2005) found that 
the NAS investment programs are inherently risky. Evaluated by the two 
most commonly used measures, that is, cost and schedule variances, for the 
FAA’s major programs (16 of them presently), the IG (FAA, 2005) found 
that 11 of these programs9 have experienced a total cost growth of over $5.6 
billion (see Figure 4), which is more than twice the FAA’s F&E budget in 
FY2005.10 Furthermore, many of these programs have had schedule 
variances ranging between 2-12 years. Two programs, local area 
augmentation system and Next Generation Communication, (LAAS and 
NEXCOM) have been withheld until further evaluation (2008) on the merits 
of each program (FAA, 2005).  
                                                 
9 These represent approximately 71% of the funds available for developing and 
acquiring air traffic control modernization projects (FAA, 2005).  
10 The cost growth is not unique to F&E programs alone. Operational costs from air 
traffic services, for example, grew by nearly $1.8 billion in real terms or by 43% 
during FY 1996-2004 (GAO, 2005). 
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Figure 4: Schedule and cost variance of some selected FAA programs (calculated over 
different periods ranging between 1998-2005; and 2005-2013) 
 
 
Source: FAA (2005, May 26). “Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions: Cost Growth and Schedule 
Delays Continue to Stall Air Traffic Modernization,” Report No. AV-2005-061. Washington 
DC: Office of the Inspector General, Federal Aviation Administration. 
 
As the industry restructured in the wake of 9/11, the Airways Trust Fund 
revenue, the main source for F&E expenditures, dwindled considerably. 
Numerous estimates (Chew, 2005) indicate that the gap between the trust 
fund collections and cost commitments are expected to widen, potentially 
affecting FAA program funding. Presently, the FAA spends considerably 
more on sustaining the NAS, than on enhancing it [see Figure 5 as reported 
in FAA (2005)].  
The program decisions underlying Figure 5 indicate that, under present 
budgetary arrangements, modernization sustainment programs dominate 
investment. Most analyses conclude that the FAA in general, and ATO in 
particular, needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for modernizing the 
NAS while minimizing risks for all the major acquisition programs. In other 
words, the FAA should meet the cost, schedule, and performance milestones 
for all its acquisition programs, especially in this fiscally challenging 
environment (FAA, 2005; GAO, 2005).  
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Figure 5: Breakdown of air traffic control modernization funding by investment 
area, 2005 
Source: FAA (2005) 
A sense of urgency dominates the current budget cycle. The FAA 
routinely manages unprecedented levels of traffic while maintaining record 
low fatal accident rates. Studies have repeatedly shown that the level and 
complexity of traffic and the productivity of controllers and NAS assets is 
unparalleled. Traffic is projected to grow. Current budgetary pressure and 
the changing business environment have made prudent investing more 
important than ever. F&E and AIP budgets growth has lagged behind the 
operations budget. An aging infrastructure and higher future traffic levels 
portend the need for an investment approach that extracts the most from the 
FAA’s limited resources. 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Risk11 is an essential part of any investment program, private or public. 
Managing risk is the job of a portfolio manager. Risk exists because the 
investor can no longer explicitly associate payoff12 with investment in any 
asset. In the market place, where return or price provides explicit signals, 
risks are traded for lower returns and vice versa. Nevertheless, similar trade-
offs can be performed in government investments, and hence, an optimal set 
of public investments can be made if choice sets (i.e., range of possible 
programs), their interdependencies, and fiscal constraints can be specified 
adequately.  
The analytical framework presented here captures the trade-offs between 
risks and expected returns in a portfolio consisting of multiple assets. Instead 
of considering that an investor’s preferences are defined over the entire 
probability distribution of the assets with every possible outcome, this 
framework supposes that investor’s preferences can be described by 
                                                 
11 Without being too specific, risks in this paper generally represent (a) technical 
risks; (b) financial risks; and (c) program management risks.  
12 Payoff is described by a set of outcomes each associated by the return distribution 
(i.e., probability of occurrence). 
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considering a few summary statistics of the probability distribution13 of the 
asset holdings. Mean and variance are two such key statistics that can 
describe the probability distribution of asset holding fairly well. Originally 
developed by Harry Markowitz,14 the mean-variance model has been the 
foundation of corporate finance for decades.  
In the framework presented below, dependencies across assets or 
projects have been given explicit consideration. This is in contrast with 
current procedure where capital investment programs are considered to be 
mutually exclusive. That is, decisions to invest depend primarily on returns 
(i.e., net present value, internal rate of return, or benefit-cost ratio) from the 
project alone. The lack of recognition of dependencies across projects often 
leads to selection bias and leaves very little room for a portfolio manager 
(i.e., ATO program manager) to compare relative risks versus relative 
returns in prioritizing projects. 
Under the present format of evaluating government projects, risks are 
considered but only in terms of evaluating cost schedules. Trade-offs 
between risks and returns—the primary driver for choice in a portfolio—is 
not present under the current investment analysis framework. The analytical 
framework presented below is offered as an alternative to evaluate decision 
rules for selecting programs within the overall capital investment programs.  
For demonstrating this framework, it is assumed that investors (or, a 
manager who decides on investments for NAS improvement, or a NAS 
portfolio manager) hold a portfolio of assets. Therefore, the focus is on the 
expected return and risks from the whole portfolio, not individual assets. 
Notice, however, that the financial and economic analysis for individual 
projects (i.e., standard cost-benefit analysis leading to internal rate of return) 
may provide important information regarding expected returns, estimated 
risks, and underlying relations or dependencies between individual assets. 
Risk is quantified by the standard deviation of the portfolio while returns are 
evaluated by the probability of events. For example, for a given expected 
return, different expected standard deviations can be obtained depending on 
the mix of assets due to varying correlations among the assets. Hence, the 
authors were able to estimate and predict some form of expected returns 
along with risks, and correlations among the assets. Furthermore, the 
underlying preference structure of the portfolio manager, that is, investor’s 
                                                 
13 Two most commonly used aggregate measures of the probability distribution of 
asset holdings are average returns (i.e., expected averages over the entire distribution) 
and standard deviation, a measure of risk or dispersion around the mean.  
14 This research that provided the foundation for portfolio theory in corporate finance 
earned Markowitz the Nobel Prize in 1990 along with William Sharpe and Merton 
Miller for developing the theory of price formation for financial assets [Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM)] and the theory of corporate finance, respectively. 
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preference for expected returns against risks, can be postulated by some 
hypothetical function.  
A portfolio of assets is characterized by two elements: expected return 
which is computed as weighted average of the return on the individual assets 
where the weight applied is the fraction of the portfolio invested in the asset. 
Thus, returns on the portfolio are calculated as the sum of all fractions of the 
portfolio held in each asset multiplied by the expected return in each asset. 
The variance, on the other hand, measures the dispersion or the expected 
value of the squared deviations of the return on the portfolio. In other words, 
expected return of an asset is a probability-weighted average of its return in 
all scenarios: E(r) = Σs Pr(s) r(s) where Pr(s)  is the probability of scenario s 
and r(s) is the return in scenario s. Variance of an asset’s return is the 
expected value of the squared deviations from the expected return, 
represented by the equation: 
σ2 = ΣsPr(s)[r(s) – E(r)]2 
The rate of return on the entire portfolio is a weighted average of the 
rates of return of each asset comprising the portfolio, with portfolio 
proportions as weights. This implies that expected rate of return on a 
portfolio is a weighted average of the expected rate of return on each 
component asset. When a risky asset is combined with a risk-free asset, the 
portfolio standard deviation equals the risky asset’s standard deviation 
multiplied by the portfolio proportion invested in the asset. 
One way to capture and quantify the effect of hedging and 
diversification of the portfolio is to construct the covariance and correlations 
(Ross et al., 1999) across individual items in the portfolio. Covariance 
measures the degree to which returns on two risky assets move in tandem. A 
positive covariance thus indicates that asset returns move together. A 
negative covariance, conversely, means that they vary inversely. Covariance 
between project i and j can be defined as: Cov (ri, rj) = Σs Pr(s) [ri (s) – 
E(ri)][rj(s) – E(rj)]. 
Often, it is easier to interpret correlation coefficient (ρ) than the 
covariance. The correlation coefficient (ρ) is constructed by scaling 
covariance to assume a value between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and 
+1 (perfect positive correlation). It is constructed as follows: ρi, j] = Cov (ri, 
rj) / σi σj. That is, the correlation coefficient between two projects equals 
their covariance divided by the product of the standard deviations.  
When two risky assets with variances σi2 and σj2, respectively, are 
combined into a portfolio (p) with portfolio weights wi and wj, respectively, 
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the portfolio variance σP2 is given by: σP2 = wi2 σi2 + wj2 σj2 + 2 wiwj 
Cov(ri, rj).  
Given this background on the structure of assets in terms of their return 
distribution (i.e., mean, standard deviation or variance; and dependencies 
within the portfolio that is defined by covariance and/or correlation 
coefficient), one can postulate the standard investor’s choice problem 
defined over several asset classes comprising the portfolio to maximize 
utility. Given the inherent property of the portfolio, the utility is also defined 
as a function of expected returns and standard deviation of return of the 
selected portfolio. More precisely,  
u = E(r) - σ2/t(k) (1) 
 
where u is the utility of the portfolio for the investor; E(r) is the expected 
return of the portfolio; σ2 is the variance of the portfolio return; and t(k) is 
risk tolerance for an investor, k, that is, t(k) is the investor’s marginal rate of 
substitution of variance for expected value (i.e., trade-off). Evaluating 
Equation 1 slightly differently, it is obvious that u is the measure of portfolio 
utility that represents risk-adjusted expected return, since it is computed by 
subtracting a risk penalty [σ2/t(k)] from the expected return E(r). Thus, for 
the portfolio as a whole, the utility function can be defined as the following:  
pux(p, k) = E(p) – σ2 (p)/t(k) (2) 
 
where E(p) is the expected value or return of portfolio p, σ2(p) is its 
variance, t(k) is investor’s risk tolerance, and pux(p, k) is the utility of 
portfolio p for investor k. Portfolio utility is measured in the same units as 
expected returns, E(p). Thus, for a given level of utility, pux, all portfolios 
must satisfy the following condition: 
pux(p, k) = E(p) – σ2 (p)/t(k) 
or                                                                                      (3) 
E(p) = pux + [1/t(k)]* σ2 (p) 
 
where pux = associated portfolio utility. Different levels of utility associated 
with higher portfolios can be depicted by a set of indifference curves15 (see 
Figure 6).  
                                                 
15 Indifference curves measures investor’s indifference between expected returns and 
standard deviation (risk). It simply states that higher expected returns have to 
accompany higher risks in order to provide same levels of utility. Alternatively, given 
the same expected return, investor prefers less standard deviation (i.e., variability in 
portfolio) than more. Obviously, the underlying assumption here is that risk is 
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Finally, 1/(t(k) measures the slope along the indifference curve that 
measures the trade-off ratio of expected return for variance, or marginal rate 
of substitution of variance for expected value.   
Given the above preference structure, how does one determine the 
choice along the indifference curve or a point on the distribution defining a 
portfolio? That is, would the investor have $10,000 for certain or a 50/50 
chance of receiving $0 or $25,000? While detailed knowledge about the 
investor’s preference structure may be revealing, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to prove that a portfolio choice may exist even without it. The 
answer to that choice problem, thankfully, may be found through 
investigating the trade-off that an investor is willing to make in the market 
place (or at some alternative shadow of such prices), other constraints, and 
levels of risk tolerance (Varian, 1999). 
 
Figure 6: Structure of preferences for a portfolio of asset choices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppose that risky assets and risk-free assets can be traded at the market 
place. This hypothetical exercise (i.e., trading risk for expected returns) 
allows us to construct the investor’s affordability set for a portfolio with risk 
to a risk-free investment.16 The weighted average of the expected return (Rp) 
                                                                                                        
inherently bad, and therefore, has to be compensated by some good which is higher 
returns (Varian, 1999). 
16 Defining risk-return trade-off in the market, not the actual return in a particular 
month or year, is the foundation of CAPM.  
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on two assets, one risky return (Rm) and one not-risky (Rf), therefore, can be 
written as: 
Rp = bRm + (1-b)Rf 
 
where b is the fraction of investment on these two assets, or, 
= Rf + b(Rm – Rf)  (4) 
 
Since Rf is risk-free, therefore, standard deviation of the portfolio (with one 
risky and one risk-free asset) is the fraction of the portfolio invested in the 
risky asset (b) times the standard deviation of the asset (vm):
17 
σ2(p) = b2σ2(m) 
or  
σ(p) = bσ(m) 
and 
b = σ(p)/σ(m) 
 
Therefore, Equation 4 can be rewritten as: 
 
Rp = Rf + [(Rm – Rf)/σ(m)]* σ(p) (5) 
 
which is the affordability line because it describes the market trade-off 
between risk [σ(p)] and expected return (Rp). Note, Rm could be any 
portfolio, but is considered here as a single choice for simplicity.  
Thus, for a given level of portfolio returns or Rp, the iso-affordability 
line (i.e., trade between Rm and Rf yielding the same portfolio return of Rp) 
or security-market line can be described by the following figure. 
                                                 
17 In other words, b measures the responsiveness of expected return (Rp) to 
movements in the market portfolio (Rm). If the portfolio were to expand to include 
multiple risky assets, then, b would be equal to covariance between the return on 
asset i and the return on the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market. 
This statistic (also known as beta from the portfolio theory) can reveal a great deal of 
information regarding the effectiveness of the portfolio. 
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Figure 7: Affordability set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice that when the portfolio consists of no risk (i.e., standard 
deviation = 0), then, Rp = Rf (i.e., vertical intercept). The slope of the iso-
affordability line is equal to (Rm – Rf)/σ(m) which measures the price of 
risk, that is, extra risk an investor must incur to enjoy a higher expected 
return. In other words, the line will be upward sloping as long as the 
expected return on the market is greater than the return on the risk free asset. 
Affordability is incomplete without the constraints and boundaries on 
portfolio choice selection. Thus, investment choices are constrained by the 
following two conditions: 
 sum(x) = 1; 
or, more generally, 
 sum(x) = L                       (6) 
where L is a constant.  
 
That is, sum of all portfolio investments exhaust the entire budget, that 
is, full-investment constraint (i.e., no slack left in budget constraint). In 
addition, project investments may require that some parts of the budget sets 
may be outside the feasibility bounded from lower and upper ends,18 that is: 
                                                 
18 For many of the capital investment projects, too low an investment solution may be 
trivial, while too high a solution may be budget busting. 
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x <= ub 
x >= lb; 
or 
 lb <= x <= ub                               (7) 
 
Now that we have defined both the choice set and the constraints, the 
goal is to find the best portfolio, that is, the one with the maximum possible 
utility. The decision variables are the asset holdings, that is, the elements of 
vector x that form the portfolio p. 
Notice, as these elements are varied, the utility of the associated 
portfolio will change. The authors wish to vary those choices (i.e., elements 
of x) until the maximum possible utility is attained. Finally, the allowable 
combinations of x choice sets are typically constrained by other factors (i.e., 
investment and boundary constraints). Therefore, the standard asset 
allocation problem (i.e., trade-off between expected return and risk that give 
rise to an efficient solution in elements of x) can be stated as:19 
 
Select:  
 x(i)  
to maximize: 
 u = E(p) – σ2(p)/t(k)                   (8) 
where:  
 E(p) = x'*e 
 σ2(p) = x'*C*x 
subject to: 
 sum(x) = L : Fully Invested 
 lb <= x <= ub : ceiling and floor conditions. 
 
                                                 
19 The dual of this primal problem is: Minimize variance subject to fixed utility, u = 
u. 
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Figure 8: Equilibrium portfolio choice resulting from optimal choice of expected return 
and risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The solution to the above problem can be best summarized in Figure 8. 
The process of finding optimal solution (E*) is reached by varying levels of 
risk and/or alternatively, by offering minimum risk for varying levels of 
expected return. Thus, from a point such as L, an investor would prefer to 
accept higher risk for more returns thus attaining a higher utility from the 
portfolio choice. Alternatively, starting from point M, the investor would do 
just the opposite and attain a higher level of utility. Thus, the point E* at 
which, the slope of the indifference curve is equal to the slope of the budget 
line, that is, (t/k) = (Rm – Rf)/σ(m), would represent the optimal choice of 
expected return and risk for a particular portfolio. Thus, to the northeast of 
E* is the efficient frontier for the choice set while to the southeast is feasible. 
By iteratively finding the optimal choice points varying the parameters 
of the above choice problem, different portfolios can be derived while 
maintaining the most efficient risk-return frontier, also known as Markowitz 
efficient frontier. The figure below summarizes the entire choice problem 
described above (Markowitz, undated).  
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Figure 9: Summary of the portfolio choice in investment process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Markowitz (undated).  
Notice that the above choice problem involves the maximization of a 
quadratic (utility) function of the decision variables, subject to a set of linear 
constraints (i.e., fully invested), some of which are inequalities (i.e., floor 
and ceilings). This non-differentiable non-linear problem is termed as a 
quadratic programming (QP) problem. It may be solved with a general QP 
algorithm; or with a procedure designed to deal only with problems that have 
similar structures. However, solutions to this problem can also be 
parametrically approximated by piece-wise linear programs, but it is 
somewhat limited. 
In this exercise, the authors demonstrate an algorithm20 that can solve 
the standard asset allocation problem in a simple and intuitive way keeping 
the QP structure. More complexities can be added on later, both in terms of 
expanding assets and recasting the problem in different ways altogether. 
While somewhat limited in its range of application, the standard problem is 
easy to program for illustrating key economic principles that may also apply 
to a very broad range of optimization problems involving project investment 
analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The example constructed here is based on Sharpe’s Gradient Method solution to a standard 
three-asset allocation problem [see http://www.stanford.edu/~wfsharpe/mia/opt/mia_opt1.htm 
for more details]. While his original algorithm was written on MATLAB, other software can be 
used to replicate this or other allocation problems. 
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SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM: AN EXAMPLE OF AN 
ALGORITHM USING GRADIENT QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING 
METHOD 
Applying the described investment portfolio methodology, the authors 
offer the following hypothetical example using hypothetical distributions and 
names for programs, for example, Program A, B, and C evaluated against 
holding cash. Accordingly, the numbers in this exercise are imaginary. They 
are not intended to reflect actual program costs and benefits, but rather as an 
illustration of this form of comparative analysis. A complete benefit cost 
analysis would be required with estimated risks and interdependencies for 
actual investment decisions. While this should be done, for this example it 
has not been done. 
The authors assume the following functional forms and other associated 
inputs for the QP:  
Assumed Utility function: 
 U(p) = E(p) – [(σ2)/tk] 
 
where: U(p) = the utility of the portfolio; E(p) = the portfolio's expected 
return; σ2 = the portfolio's standard deviation of return; and tk = parametric 
risk tolerance for investor. The following table provides the parameters of 
the choice problem along with other constructs. 
 
Table 1: Parameters for the choice problem21 
Correlation Matrix22 
 
                                                 
21 All numbers in this demonstration here are hypothetical and for illustration 
purposes only.  
22 Correlation coefficient is an easier statistic to interpret than covariance, +1 
representing perfect correlation and -1 representing perfectly negative. Correlation 
coefficient between 2 variables equals their covariance divided by the product of the 
standard deviations.  
Source: Sharp (2006), The Gradient Method, Available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~wfsharpe/mia/opt/mia_opt1.htm; Accessed on April 26, 2006.  
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The MIN and MAX, or lb and ub from the above choice problem, 
represent lower (all zero) and upper bounds (all 1) of proportion of 
investment on four investment choices, cash, PROGRAM A , PROGRAM B 
and PROGRAM C.23 ExpRet [i.e., E(p)] and StdDev (i.e., σ2) represent, 
respectively, expected returns and standard deviations of the assets stated in 
terms of percent return per year.24 Correlation matrix estimates correlations 
among the asset classes which can be calculated on the basis of the 
covariance matrix, C.25 
Finally, three more inputs are required. For simplicity, we assume L = 
sum(x) = 1, that is, sum of all allocations equal to 1; somewhat moderate 
risk-taking attitude, and hence, Rt = t/k = 50 (100 would be complete risk 
taking while 0 representing complete risk averse) and finally, trading 
decisions (i.e., swapping one investment for another) has been set at 
marginal utility cut-off (MUbuy – MUsell) at 0.0001. In other words, if there 
is a possibility of slight change (0.0001) in utility, through buying and 
selling (also known as swapping) and hence cumulative impacts through 
marginal utilities, then, the investor would alter his portfolio to realize the 
potential gain.  
Notice that our example involves four assets, that is, cash, PROGRAM 
A, PROGRAM B, and PROGRAM C. With optimized utility, the solution 
space is five-dimensional. With added restrictions (i.e., full-investment 
constraint) imposed, we are able to present the allocations in three 
dimensions (since the fourth asset is the residual sum). This makes it 
possible to graph the relationship between three of the assets (not with the 
utility). The resulting surface will have some of the attributes of a hill. 
Notice, however, that only a portion (not all) of this utility hill is feasible 
given the constraints. We must therefore restrict our search to coordinates in 
which the sum of the amounts invested in all assets to be 1.0 or less and both 
upper and lower boundaries have been met. 
                                                 
23 Similarly, these hypothetical names have been used to represent different 
investment choices that the portfolio manager may have.  
24 Notice that for real applications, as opposed to the hypothetical example presented 
in this paper, expected returns from similar projects (or those which have been 
estimated by individual project’s cost-benefit analyses) can replace these values. 
Similarly, the standard deviations and correlations among their returns can best be 
estimated from projects’ financials and/or from expert opinions. In absence of these 
parameters, one can experiment with range of expected values (e.g., expected returns 
with range of values from 5-30% annually) with corresponding assumptions 
regarding correlations in order to derive the solutions.  
25 As discussed earlier, the correlation coefficient between 2 variables equals their 
covariance divided by the product of the standard deviations. 
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Optimizing the four-asset portfolio requires climbing to the highest 
feasible point, given restrictions, on the hill by swapping assets. This can be 
performed in multiple stages. First, we start with a feasible portfolio that 
satisfies all the conditions stated above. Second, we find the feasible 
direction in which we can move upward at the greatest rate. More 
specifically, we select the direction that will result in the greatest increase in 
altitude (utility) per step (change in portfolio holdings)—that is, the steepest 
gradient26. Third, having selected a direction, we continue climbing until a 
new peak or a boundary line have been reached and no more gain can be had 
from further climbing. That is, given the restrictions on the portfolio, a climb 
through swap/buy is feasible when the following conditions have been met: 
(a) the asset to be sold is below the upper bound (ub); (b) the asset to be 
bought is above its lower bound (lb); and, finally, (c) marginal utility gain 
from this swap is higher. Then we determine the feasible direction of 
steepest ascent again and repeat the process. When no feasible direction 
leads upward, we stop. These rules together also give optimal amount to 
swap when the process of improvement stops yielding the equilibrium. 
Given the nature of the terrain in a standard problem, this procedure will 
place us on the highest allowable point, that is, provide the portfolio with the 
greatest possible utility. 
Figure 10 presents the output of the portfolio choice simulation that we 
performed using Sharpe’s algorithm. Starting with baseline distribution of 
asset holding, clearly, there is a scope for reallocation that may improve the 
investor’s utility. For example, given the parameters, the optimal portfolio 
allocation indicates that investor’s welfare can be improved by moving away 
from cash holding altogether. 
A large beneficiary of the portfolio realignment, given the assumed 
hypothetical parameters, appears to be Program A. The results of these 
reallocations are reflected in the market portfolio as a whole via the increase 
in expected returns (from 11.243% to 11.516%) and a reduction in risk (from 
13.558% to 13.285%). The increase in expected returns and reduction in risk 
exposure, in our hypothetical example, increased utility (from 7.566 to 
7.987, or 5.56%) in the investor’s market asset holding—clearly an optimal 
move. 
 
                                                 
26 This method is called Gradient Method.  
 Bhadra and Morser 25 
 
 
Figure 10: Output of the portfolio choice simulations 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this paper, the FAA’s current investment methodology and budget 
allocations were reviewed. A preliminary investment portfolio analytical 
framework that may address some of the noted deficiencies was laid out. By 
drawing upon the well developed theories of corporate finance, the authors 
have offered an investment framework that takes into account risk, expected 
returns, and inherent dependencies across NAS programs. The authors 
present an algorithm in this paper and apply it to a hypothetical four-asset 
allocation problem. By iteratively solving the QP problem, the authors 
demonstrate that reallocation may in fact result in improvement in investor’s 
welfare. 
This proposed framework is relatively simple and has been used for 
demonstration purpose only. It can be improved in numerous ways. For 
example, the framework can be expanded to include multiple assets and 
realistic values for parameters to include expected returns, standard 
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deviations, and interdependencies, in particular, tasks that may be dealt with 
in future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
The volume of air traffic worldwide is still in constant growth despite unfair events that 
sometimes occur. The demand for regional air transport is also increasing, thanks in part to 
the use of new vehicles purposely designed for short range flights which make this means 
of transport more attractive than in the past. This paper studies the possibility of using 
aircraft capable of vertical or short takeoff or landing (V/STOL), in particular the tiltrotor, 
in the regional air transport market and the impact on airport capacity that the use of this 
craft would have. With this in mind the advantages and disadvantages of using this vehicle 
are identified, as well as the changes to be made to the air transport system in order to 
exploit its full potential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent air traffic developments have shown a consistent increase in the 
volume of traffic handled by regional airports. The growth in regional airport 
traffic has been considerably furthered by an increase in inter-European 
connections and flight frequency, boosted by an increase in point-to-point 
passenger transport between the most important European cities and, 
therefore, more flights feeding the European hubs. This new phenomenon 
does not question the role of these hubs, but does open interesting 
perspectives. It is, in fact, in a country’s interest to support growth in 
European and domestic point-to-point traffic, develop its potential for 
capturing tourist traffic and favor conditions that avoid a loss of traffic to 
competing hubs. 
The regional airline sector today is one of the most dynamic. More than 
300 million passengers from around the world crowded regional aircraft 
during the last year. This was due to various strategies adopted by regional 
companies in order to become more integrated and to a change in their 
operational networks in an effort to define and maintain their role within the 
current movement towards liberalization and globalization (Graham, 1997). 
An element emerging from an analysis of regional air transport 
developments is that the increase in flights has considerably increased the 
problem of airport congestion to levels almost reaching saturation point and, 
as a consequence, has overloaded the air traffic control (ATC) system taking 
it to the limit of its operational capacity and safety limits. The consequence 
is that airports are no longer able to handle all the converging flights, 
producing frequent delays which result in the airport losing its main 
characteristic: speed of transfer. 
The use of aircraft capable of vertical take-offs and landings (VTOL) 
and/or capable of short take-offs and landings (STOL) offers one possible 
way of making the situation less critical. An aircraft capable of vertical and 
short take-offs and landings (V/STOL) is a category of aircraft to which the 
helicopter traditionally belongs and, more recently, the tiltrotor. This latter is 
between rotating wing and fixed wing craft (i.e., between the helicopter and 
the traditional airplane). It was developed for military use and is now being 
developed for the civilian transport market. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Salvatore Caprì obtained a Ph.D. degree in Transportation Technique and Economics in 2002 
at the University of Palermo. His main research fields are air transport management and urban 
transport systems. 
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In this context, regional air traffic transport operating with rotating wing 
craft can be inserted into the wider transport system offering, prevalently, a 
supplementary rapid link service for specific types of connection. If it is true 
that there is a certain diversion from other means of transport towards air 
transport, this is certainly, to a considerable degree, due to the time saved in 
connections and a reduction in delays. 
V/STOL can use different flight procedures from fixed-wing craft. 
Exploiting the maximum flight potential of these machines, it would be 
possible to achieve a very evident reduction in approach, landing, take-off, 
and departure times. Benefits could come from an operative use of the 
tiltrotor passenger craft by increasing the number of operations per hour in 
the airports and deviating part of their traffic towards this aircraft—
especially for minor routes—thereby freeing some slots that could be used 
for larger aircraft with a greater operating range. On the other hand, with 
suitable procedures, inter-regional connections could be increased to and 
from the large hubs departing from vertiports more widely distributed over 
the territory and therefore able to ensure a better integration in a territorial 
context. 
In addition, airport congestion is not only limited by runway capacity. 
Sometimes it is also limited by inadequate access by ground transportation 
systems. A V/STOL feeder line could improve the system. Despite several 
helicopter services at some airports, which have not been so successful, the 
world in 2030 will be even more congested and complex and V/STOL could 
be part of an integrated transport concept (Schmitt, 2001). 
REGIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN EUROPE 
The business of regional air companies is a continuously developing 
phenomenon, strengthened by the events in past years and encouraged by 
forecasts of ever increasing traffic. A possible scenario for regional air 
transport in the near future is greatly influenced by the fact that airports have 
now reached their capacity limit and problems created by noise and 
atmospheric pollution are obliging the aeronautical industry to make precise 
choices when buying aircraft. 
The forecasts of both air companies and airplane producers tend towards 
a choice of larger models than before (e.g., the almost complete abandoning 
of the 50 seat models for the 70 seat ones). The perspective of regional 
aircraft manufacturers is that of producing a family of aircraft that offer 
operational and cost flexibility with maintenance and running aimed at 
simplicity and savings. 
In the European regional air transport market there is still a lot of 
confusion and many differences between the various airlines. One area of 
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confusion is the total variety of aircraft that fill the skies and airports. This 
non-uniformity of the fleet leads to an inevitable increase in costs both for 
maintenance and crew training. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution 
of two large families of aircraft—turbojet and turboprop—in European 
regional areas.   
 
Figure 1. Fleet distribution of European regional airlines, by region, 2002 
 
Source: (ERA, 2002) 
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Figure 2. Passenger fleet, turboprop and turbofan split for European regional airlines, 
2002 
 
Source: (ERA, 2002) 
 
Figure 2 shows the trend of regional transport fleet distribution 
according to propulsion type (turbofan and turboprop). It shows an increase 
in jets compared to turboprops. This is the case especially in aircrafts seating 
from 40 to 70. Over the years, a reduction in the number of large turboprops 
(40-60 seats) has also been seen, replaced by the turbojet with the same 
capacity but offering better performance and having more advanced 
technology, that better meets the needs of the market, and also receives a 
positive reaction from its users, due to the greater comfort they offer. 
From sales forecasts and orders placed by the main aeronautical 
industries it is possible to define even further the near future scenario for 
regional air transport. The manufacturing industries agree that aircraft with 
20-39 seats will increase by 12%, while about 45% of the total will be 
represented by aircraft with 40-59 seats; 33% represented by aircraft with 
60-79 seats, while the remaining 10% made up of planes with 80-99 seats 
(Bombardier, 2001). 
The airline fleets undertaking regional transport will, therefore, undergo 
substantial modifications. Forecasts show that almost 50% of the world 
market will be represented in the near future by planes with 50 seats, those 
with 70 seats will constitute 31% of the total, while those with 30 seats will 
decrease from the present 38% to 12%. The number of craft with 70 seats or 
more will, instead, almost double going from today’s 7% to 13% in the next 
few years (ERA, 2002). 
The main pointers for establishing the state of health of European 
airlines, especially those offering regional transport services, can be deduced 
from the following graphs and tables that summarize the fundamental factors 
for the characterization of air transport. The data that follow are from 
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European Regions Airline Association sources and refer to 2002 and the 
beginning of 2003. 
It can be seen that in the last period examined (2002 – first quarter 2003) 
the increase in regional passenger traffic underwent a slight drop, which 
according to the experts can be attributed to the war in Iraq, but nevertheless 
constituted about 7-8% monthly. This is controversial data that, on the one 
hand provides an incentive for companies to develop this sector but on the 
other reinforces worries regarding an imminent collapse of the air transport 
system due to airport congestion. 
Figure 3 illustrates the trend of the load factor of aircraft, which is 
defined as the ratio between the number of passengers and the available 
capacity, and represents another important parameter for evaluating both 
airlines and aircraft manufacturing companies. It shows how there have not 
been significant increases, except for the seasonal ones, in the load factor 
value in the last years. 
 
Figure 3. Passenger load factor growth for European regional airlines, 1998-2002.  
 
 
Source: (ERA, 2002) 
 
From an evaluation of all these factors it emerges that aircraft fleets 
have adapted in order to respond better to market needs, in which the new 
aircraft models must satisfy the variability of all these features.  
From an observation of the collected data it can be deduced that 
turboprop models continue to lose favor with both the airlines who should 
buy them and the manufacturers, who view turbofan models more favorably. 
One of the causes for this change in strategy on the part of the producers is 
that, besides having higher operating speeds and consequently shorter 
connection times, they also offer greater comfort to passengers. 
THE TILTROTOR AND ITS FEATURES 
Overview 
After more than twenty years of research and development the craft 
known as the tiltrotor—in particular model BA609 produced by Agusta, 
capable of combining the speed and autonomy of a turboprop and having the 
capacity to land and take-off in the same way as a helicopter—is now on the 
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point of becoming a reality in the field of commercial transport services. 
This is proved by the fact that the first model ever realized for the 
commercial sector will be on the market in the near future and also by the 
interest demonstrated by research organizations [Ames Research Center, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)] and manufacturers 
(Eurocopter, Bell, Sikorsky) for the development of this kind of aircraft. A 
study carried out on behalf of the United States Department of 
Transportation (US DOT, 1995) concluded that a new kind of civilian 
transport system based on tiltrotors would be possible in the medium term 
and that a craft carrying from 10 to 40 passengers was technically, 
economically and environmentally feasible. 
At the same time, Sikorsky is actively developing the technology for the 
next generation of tiltrotors, based on engine gondolas having rotors of 
varying diameter created in order to reduce flight problems after conversion 
(excessive penalization of performance due to the large rotor disc). They all 
descend from one model, the XV-15, developed by NASA, the U.S. Army 
and Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., together at the Ames Laboratory. Over 
the course of more than twenty years’ research carried out on them, there is 
now a sufficiently large database to be able to develop two projects, the V-22 
and the BA609. 
As already mentioned, the tiltrotor has cruising capability typical of the 
modern turboprops (comfort, speed and autonomy) and a take-off/departure 
and landing/approach capability typical of rotating wing machines, 
consequently making ground operations in much more limited spaces 
possible, with less expensive, less complicated and less bulky infrastructures 
than those necessary for conventional aircraft (CTOL). 
Structurally the tiltrotor is equipped with a special propelling apparatus 
(proptors). This is made up of two engine gondolas mounted in 
correspondence to the wing extremities capable of rotating entirely at an 
angle of more than ninety degrees. In this way not only is vertical take-off 
possible so is backward movement while in helicopter mode (HELO mode). 
Once vertical take-off has taken place, the rotation of the gondolas is the 
most critical phase of the craft’s whole flight complexity, both for landing 
and take-off. In this phase the flight mode changes from being supported by 
the propulsive equipment to a normal cruising flight phase. The considerable 
workload to which pilots of the V-22 military transport aircraft are subject 
has made the creation of a commercial model deriving directly from them 
highly improbable. The same reasons dictated the choices of controls 
implemented in the BA609. 
In general the tiltrotor, the natural evolution and union of fixed wing and 
rotating wing aircraft, is a machine characterized by the possibility of 
operating indifferently as a CTOL, STOL or VTOL aircraft according to the 
needs of the moment. A commercial tiltrotor could take off vertically and 
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change to the typical flight conditions of a plane in less than thirty seconds, 
accelerate to a speed of more than 200 knots (like a jet) to fly to a height of 
more than 30,000 feet and, once cruising, fly at more than 300 knots for the 
whole stretch. On arrival, a steep descent at maximum speed can be 
hypothesized with the aid of navigation systems based on global positioning 
system (GPS) precision equipment, a rapid deceleration then a transfer to 
HELO mode to complete the final approach up to a vertical touch down 
using instrumental meteorological conditions navigation systems. 
Compared to a conventional regional turboprop (for example the SAAB 
340 or the DHC-8-100) the tiltrotor has a better turning range (3800/3900 
feet at 60 knots compared to 7700/7800 feet at 120 knots) and steeper 
descent and ascent angles (more than 55° in ascent at a speed of 110/120 
knots and 12/15° in descent at less than 45/90 knots against 12° and 3° at 
65/120 knots). 
The departure phase of the tiltrotor can be divided into 4 sub-phases: 
1. Take-off; 
2. Acceleration to ascent speed in HELO mode; 
3. Change to aircraft (A/C) mode; and 
4. Ascent and acceleration in A/C mode. 
Once the critical decision point at about 55 feet has been overcome, the pilot 
from this point on begins vertical acceleration in order to take the aircraft to 
a height where he or she can start to vary the propeller configuration, 
rotating them and bringing them to the A/C flight mode position (i.e., similar 
to an airplane). For the tiltrotor to take off using this type of take-off 
procedure certain criteria should be followed. In fact, it is necessary to have 
(a) enough height to overcome any obstacles near the platform, and (b) in the 
case of failed take-off, the distance to the departure point must be about 600 
feet. 
Descent in A/C mode is very similar to that of a normal fixed-wing 
airplane with an angle depending mainly on traffic control and passenger 
comfort; to begin the change back to tiltrotor form, speed must be reduced to 
about 140 knots while the flaps must be positioned at about 30° and 
propeller speed must be increased from 80% to 100%. At the same time a 
sophisticated system instantly adjusts the propeller angle with variations of 
2°, considerably helping the complicated maneuvers of the pilot. 
The principal differences of a V/STOL from both a traditional plane and 
a helicopter are reported in Table 1, from which it can be particularly noted 
that the landing and take-off (LTO) distances are considerably less that those 
of normal fixed-wing craft, giving a high flexibility, above all, in areas near 
the airport where the final LTO operations take place. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of helicopter, tiltrotor and conventional aircraft 
 
 Helicopter Tiltrotor Conventional Aircraft 
Speed -25 - +160 kts -25 - +350 kts +100 - +480 kts 
Sideward Movement 
Capability 
20 kts right and left None 
Maneuverability at 
Low Speed 
Excellent Extremely bad 
Landing and Take-off 
Distance 
0 – 600 ft. 3,000 – 10,000 ft. 
Climb Path Angle Up to 90° Up to 15° 
Approach Path Angle Up to15° (STOL) Up to 20° (STOL) Up to 6° 
 
Due to the tiltrotor’s particular features, the development of the BA609 
posed some fundamental objectives: 
1. Reduce the pilot’s workload. This objective is to allow the pilot to 
obtain the desired result from his or her controls by adopting both 
the control techniques that are peculiar to the tiltrotor and using 
conventional control techniques. This will simplify the transition of 
pilots coming from helicopters or planes; 
2. Improve flight safety and reliability. From its conception the 
V/STOL has been endowed with an excess of controls and 
monitoring equipment with well-timed alarms that guarantee 
complete safety in the case of transitory phases due to faults and the 
automatic reconfiguration of the system; 
3. Reduce costs and weight. This has been reached thanks to the use of 
the most advanced flight systems developed during simulations that 
reproduced high risk situations as faithfully as possible and 
comparisons made with results coming from flight trials of other 
crafts. 
 
The two best-known tiltrotor models are the Agusta BA609 and Boeing 
Osprey V-22 (see Figure 4). The Agusta BA609 is now at an advanced point 
of certification by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and should 
start production and commercialized service in the first months of 2007, 
having already met with considerable success. The manufacturer has 
received about 700 orders from all over the world (Augusta, personal 
communication). The Boeing OSPREY V-22 is in a renewal phase having 
already completed many flight hours for verification and certification. 
The V-22 has various drawbacks deriving from its implementation and 
the reason for its creation, being in fact conceived essentially as a war plane. 
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It has, therefore, some specifications that distance it from the commercial 
transport field, for example its high noise level goes over the limits imposed 
by the FAA. The fuselage is very heavy, originally built with materials 
designed to impede projectiles in a war situation. It has limited 
maneuverability and is a heavy workload for its pilots. However, it is 
presumed that some of its problems will be resolved in the near future 
(Jaworowski & Dane, 2003). 
Apart from the two models already described there are, of course, others 
in various stages of development, due to the need to improve their properties, 
especially in terms of the number of passengers carried. Both NASA and 
space agencies in Europe have carried out studies and begun planning and 
feasibility studies of the various models, having already carried out research 
regarding replacement of 30-40 passenger (pax) jets. Studies of the European 
Future Advanced Rotocraft (EUROFAR) 30 pax started in 1988 and it is 
expected to be produced in three different versions.  
 
Figure 4. The Agusta BA609 (left) and the Boeing Osprey V-22(right) tiltrotors 
 
 
Agusta, utilizing previous research and prototype experience and also 
data coming from ERUOFAR, has set up the planning of a new convertible 
plane called the Enhanced Rotorcraft Innovative Concept Achievement 
(ERICA). ERICA will succeed the EUROFAR. This represents a new model 
of the tiltrotor concept, as it will be a union of the concepts coming from the 
EUROFAR 30 pax and the BA609 projects, in addition, more 
technologically advanced solutions will also be introduced. An innovative 
solution is represented by the fact that a portion of the wings is attached to 
the engine. This is a particularly important aspect in that it greatly reduces 
the aerodynamic drag produced by the wing surface during vertical take-off, 
giving the aircraft a much easier take-off with less fuel consumption. 
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Advantages of the Civil Tiltrotor (CTR) 
In synthesis, tiltrotors compared to traditional airplanes have: 
1. The possibility of rapidly ascending and descending; 
2. Great maneuverability, even at low speeds, which permits a 
very steep glide slope for approach and take-off, thanks also to 
their responsiveness in reacting to commands; 
3. A not-necessarily fixed approach direction for LTO; 
4. Excellent maneuverability at low speeds which gives flight 
precision during the final phases of landing, ensuring a 
minimum occupation of airspace; and 
5. Extreme flexibility at low speeds making it less sensitive to 
adverse atmospheric conditions as compared to traditional 
fixed-wing aircraft. 
For all this, if tiltrotors are forced to function within the same approach 
and take-off lines as traditional aircraft, the potential of the CTR will be 
negated. That is why the introduction of suitable, independent procedures is 
needed in order to allow them to be fully exploited. This system would be 
simultaneous and non-interfering (SNI) and allow a combination of the 
aircraft’s peculiar features with control procedures and flight rules be based 
on its specific performance so that instrument flight rules (IFR) simultaneous 
and independent operations are possible. The system is based on the 
differentiation of the final approach and take-off area (FATOs) for V/STOL 
and on establishing new instrumental standard flight paths associated to 
transition corridors for V/STOL ascent and descent. Therefore, SNI 
operations complete the standard arrival system, by introducing steeper 
instrumental approaches to a separate touchdown and lift-off area or a 
parallel/converging runway. 
Actually, such improvements require the full operational application of a 
GPS to air navigation, which would allow the highest capacity levels to be 
obtained, even if the microwave landing system and distance measurement 
equipment approach seems to be a good temporary solution for navigation in 
the ascent and approach stretches, permitting curved trajectories. 
The positioning of the new V/STOL site is regulated by three 
fundamental parameters: 
1. Located far from fixed-wing airplane runways in order to have 
the maximum independence between operations; 
2. Be a relatively short distance from the terminal buildings, a 
maximum of five miles, so as not to lose the V/STOL’s 
advantages of speedy air transfer due to excessive ground 
transfer times; and 
3. Near to the existing airport structure in order to minimize the 
noise effect; however, as shown in Figure 5, V/STOL noise 
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tracks are smaller than CTOL ones, due to the steeper climb 
and approach path angles. 
 
Figure 5. The new concepts of Enhanced Rotorcraft Innovative Concept Achievement 
(left) and European Future Advanced Rotorcraft 30 passenger (right) tiltrotors  
 
 
 
Many studies have been carried out about the noise effect of tiltrotors 
and there is no doubt that this problem could create environmental limits for 
the civilian use of tiltrotors, especially near urban areas. One study was 
performed in which the noise levels of the EUROFAR 30 pax tiltrotor and a 
normal transport aircraft were compared in zones in the immediate vicinity 
of an airport. This kind of research found that a CTR has a noise level that, 
in vertical flight configuration, is comparable to that of a normal large 
helicopter and even as much as three effective perceived noise levels less. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of noise tracks for aircraft with conventional take-off and landing 
(CTOL), short take-off and landing (STOL) and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ferrara, 2002 
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At the same time, the noise level of a CTR is higher than that of a 
traditional airplane, particularly during take-off. These results are shown in 
Figure 6, in which the airport protection area and the noise restraints 
imposed by the International Civil Aviation Organization certification are 
highlighted. From this figure it can be seen that if tiltrotors were used in 
vertical flight mode in a normal airport, the protection zone could be reduced 
considerably. 
 
Operating costs 
The authors are carrying out a study aiming at the definition of the 
operating cost of the tiltrotor, in comparison with other aircraft, used for 
regional air services. These aircraft are the: (a) ATR-42; (b) Cessna Citation 
2; and (c) Bell Helicopter 412EP. Figure 7 shows some crucial data of these 
aircraft, in terms of general features, performance and costs. Some data have 
been provided directly or indirectly by the manufacturers, and the others 
have been calculated. 
Figure 7. Tiltrotor and fixed-wing airport noise protection areas  
 
 
Source: Ferrara, 2002 
 
Operating costs are divided into direct operating costs (DOC) and 
indirect operating costs (IOC). The DOC concern all the activities that are 
directly connected to the transport service; they include fuel consumption, 
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crew wages, maintenance costs, and also amortization and assurance costs. 
The IOC depend on the general layout of the company and its management 
criteria. 
Taking into accounts both the operating costs and the general features of 
the considered aircraft (especially the maximum passenger pay load), we get 
a (rough) estimate of the breakeven fare, which is the fare to apply to meet 
exactly the cost of the service, without any profit. The values shown in 
Figure 7 refer to an IOC incidence of 30% and a load factor of 60% and are 
expressed in dollars per passenger per hour. 
As a result of these estimates, the 9-seat tiltrotor operating costs (and the 
breakeven fares) seem to be at the same level than the ones typical of the 
regional turbojets, thus confirming two facts: 
1. The present tiltrotor can be a convenient alternative to the 
regional turbojets along short distances, where the speed gap 
can be covered by the lower terminal time; and 
2. Future CTRs, with a pay load of about 30 pax, may be even 
more convenient, assuming that operating costs increase less 
than proportionally with the number of seats. 
 
Disadvantages of the CTR 
Until a few years ago the use of this type of rotating wing aircraft within 
airports as regular scheduled transport was not feasible, given that 
procedures specifically studied for IFR flights did not exist. Having to follow 
standard LTO procedures made it impossible for V/STOL craft to maintain 
the regulation speeds (to name just one parameter) because the standard 
approach speeds were studied for faster machines. For this reason it was not 
possible to complete this phase within the assigned slot, thereby occupying 
more than one. This is why it is often preferable to follow the general 
aviation norms, that is, contact flying and low altitude flying, negating its 
potential for IFR flight. New flight procedures come from this need to 
modify the present state of affairs, which as regards airport airspace means, 
steeper approaches, instrumental flight with the help of precision GPS, and 
other elements. 
With the new CTR models some problems have been resolved that, 
during the years, have heavily penalized and continue to penalize other 
V/STOLs, for example high maintenance costs due to mechanical 
complexity and critical conditions of usage or environmental problems 
(noise) linked to the features of the craft and the type of usage (e.g., at low 
quota or not, or whether over urban or rural areas). Up to now these limiting 
factors have been the reason why use of this vehicle has not been more 
widespread, especially in areas in which they do not operate but in which 
suitable conditions for their use could exist. 
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THE CIVIL TILTROTOR AND AIRPORT CAPACITY 
Delays due to airport overcrowding and congestion cost international air 
carriers approximately 4 billion dollars in 2000 and an estimated 5.2 billion 
dollars in 2004. The European Commission estimates the cost of delays in 
2000 due to air traffic congestion was 3.8 billion Euro. This situation is 
matched by the fact that inter-European flight departures have an average 
delay of 15 minutes in 28.3% of cases (Ferrara, 2002). It can be noted that 
more air traffic means not only more traffic in the sky but also more activity 
and obstructions on the runways and apron, as well as inside the airport 
landside. 
 
The airport capacity 
An airport’s capacity is defined as the number of flights (landings and 
take-offs) that can be carried out within a determined period of time with an 
average delay falling within acceptable time limits. Considering that with an 
increase in the number of flights, the average delay also increases, it is 
therefore necessary to choose a reasonably tolerable delay in order to 
determine capacity. 
Ideal maximum capacity is when the time intervals between successive 
operations are equal to the respective occupation times of the aircraft using 
the runway and there is no variation either in the time intervals between 
aircraft or between their runway occupation times. Naturally these are ideal 
conditions. In practice, during peak periods queues can produce ever 
increasing delays as the queue lengthens. Therefore, the practical operating 
capacity of a single runway with many exits can be considerably less than 
the ideal, according to the amount of delay considered acceptable. Normally 
four minutes is held to be acceptable (Ignaccolo & Inturri, 2001). 
Airport capacity depends on factors such as the layout of the aerodrome, 
the runways and taxiways, the characteristics of the aircraft using the airport, 
weather conditions and control techniques for air traffic management in the 
terminal area. 
 
Why the tiltrotor may increase capacity 
In the 1960s and 1970s when the first studies regarding the V/STOL 
concept were carried out, it was already time to start resolving specific 
problems such as excessive connection times between the starting points and 
destinations of a journey and the airports and the lack of really convenient 
alternative solutions to road or rail connections over short-to-medium 
distances. The same can be said of technical capacity, such as excessive 
consumption of fuel by the engines of that time, excessive noise and 
pollution, and considerable plane weight requiring the use of oversized 
engines needing greatly increased fuel loads. 
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The idea of using tiltrotors within airports for regional/inter-regional 
airport movements with the primary aim of increasing capacity came from a 
renewed interest in the market for such machines. The reasons are obvious, 
in that: 
1. They constitute a really valid, competitive substitute to other 
highly expensive and not easily accomplished solutions (the 
building of new runways for example); and 
2. They can replace planes of an equal capacity because their 
particular design characteristics make them highly versatile and 
easy to handle. 
 
Estimating capacity increase 
In this section of the paper we try to establish quantitatively the 
contribution in terms of capacity resulting from the use of tiltrotors as 
substitutes for medium capacity planes, using the Blumstein model for 
movements relating only to arrivals (Horonjeff & McKelvey, 1994). We 
have referred, therefore, to an airport using only one runway and for which 
the precise composition in terms of aircraft types using the terminal area is 
known. 
For this part of the analysis we do not refer to the use of CTRs in 
completely vertical take-off mode, but imagine their use only in short take-
off mode. Compared to a turboprop aircraft, the CTR has the ability to land 
and take-off in relatively short distances of around 600-1,000 feet with a 
runway occupation time of less than 35 seconds. We also considered a 
descent path equal to 2.5 nautical miles (NM), as stated in the producer’s 
technical specifications, and less restrictive separation spaces than those of 
the turboprop, given the low level of disturbance caused by turbulence 
coming from the wake vortex of preceding planes. 
In the following tables the data used for determining airport capacity are 
estimated for three case studies: 
1. Without tiltrotors; 
2. Using CTRs to completely replace medium aircraft; 
3. Using CTRs in an ever-growing percentage of substitution for 
heavy and large aircraft. 
 
Table 2 shows the types of aircraft considered for the relative 
percentages and ground speeds, as well as the relative runway occupation 
times once the craft has landed and finally the length of the common descent 
path. The space separations among aircraft types, due to wake vortex effects, 
are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Aircraft compositions and characteristics for airport capacity evaluation 
Aircraft 
Type 
Composition 
Case Study 1 
Composition
Case Study 2
Final 
Approach 
Speed [kts]
Final 
Approach 
Speed 
[km/hr] 
Runway 
Occupancy 
Time 
[seconds] 
Common 
Path Length 
[nm] 
Heavy 30% 30% 140 259.84 70 5 
Large 30% 30% 125 232 60 5 
Medium 35% 0% 110 204.16 55 5 
Small 5% 5% 90 167.04 50 5 
V/STOL 0% 35% 100 185.6 35 2.5 
V/STOL – aircraft capable of vertical and short take-off and landing 
 
Table 3. Space separations among aircraft types, in nautical miles 
  Aircraft Type 
  Heavy Large Medium Small V/STOL 
Heavy 4 5 5 5 4 
Large 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 2 
Medium 2.5 2.5 2.5 4 1.9 
Small 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 Pr
ec
ed
in
g 
A
ir
cr
af
t T
yp
e 
V/STOL 2.5 2.5 2.5 4 1.9 
V/STOL – aircraft capable of vertical and short take-off and landing 
 
Referring to the Blumstein model, it is possible to calculate the time 
separations among the aircraft types. These are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Time separations among aircraft types, in seconds 
  Aircraft Type 
  Heavy Large Medium Small V/STOL 
Heavy 102.86 128.57 128.57 128.57 102.86 
Large 79.71 72.00 72.00 129.60 60.00 
Medium 99.35 91.64 81.82 130.91 62.18 
Small 135.71 128.00 118.18 100.00 88.40 Pr
ec
ed
in
g 
A
ir
cr
af
t T
yp
e 
V/STOL 100.00 100.00 100.00 160.00 68.40 
V/STOL – aircraft capable of vertical and short take-off and landing 
 
These values lead to a capacity estimate for a runway used only for 
arrivals in Case Study 1, with no use of tiltrotors, equal to 36.71 movements 
per hour. For Case Study 2, we assume a complete substitution of the 
medium aircraft with tiltrotors. The time separations do not vary, while the 
compound probability Pij of having an aircraft of type j following an aircraft 
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of type i varies with respect to Case Study 1. For Case Study 2 the runway 
capacity is equal to 38.55 movements per hour. 
The increase in airport capacity from Case Study 1 to Case Study 2 is 
quite slight, about 5%. Obviously, when the percentage of medium aircraft is 
greater than that (e.g., in regional airports), the capacity increase may be 
more relevant. 
On the other hand, for congested airports, even a slight increase in 
airport capacity can lead to a significant decrease in the average delay 
suffered by all aircraft, thus lowering operating costs and making that airport 
more attractive to them. 
Hypothesizing an ever-growing percentage use of the tiltrotor, which 
corresponds to the introduction of larger crafts, we calculated the respective 
increase in airport capacity, which is shown on Table 5. 
Table 5. Estimates of airport capacity increase for five case studies of varying aircraft 
composition 
 Size/type of  aircraft 
Case 
Study Heavy Large Medium Small V/STOL
Capacity 
[movements/hour] % Increase 
1 30% 30% 35% 5% 0% 36.71  
2 30% 30% 0% 5% 35% 38.55 5.00% 
3a 20% 20% 0% 5% 55% 40.80 11.14% 
3b 15% 15% 0% 5% 65% 42.29 15.18% 
3c 10% 10% 0% 5% 75% 44.07 20.03% 
3d 10% 10% 0% 2% 78% 45.74 24.58% 
V/STOL – aircraft capable of vertical and short take-off and landing 
 
Capacity for CTR exclusive runways 
The situation examined does not presume using a CTR capable of 
vertical take-off, but instead imagines using a version capable of short take-
off. The commercial tiltrotor can board a greater number of passengers and 
take-off in a greatly reduced space, not vertically, but still with relatively 
shorter distances than those necessary for normal fixed wing aircraft. 
The FATO for an aircraft using VTOL can be any surface (about 1,000 
feet long)—both inside or outside the airport—that can be used as a LTO 
area. It could therefore be a taxiing area, or a runway no longer in use, or a 
segment of a secondary runway used for STOL operations. Once the steep 
descent starting point had been reached or when ATC requests it, a descent 
procedure with elevated glide slopes and maximum speed up to the 
touchdown zone would begin. 
The concept of minimum speed associated with the IFR flight 
certification disappears with the tiltrotor’s capability to conserve all its 
maneuverability even at very low speeds. In the absence of a lower speed 
limit for approach the potential steepness of the descent path can 
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comfortably reach 12/13 degrees. Simulations have even foreseen a capacity 
to operate with glide slopes at speeds of less than 50 knots. Eventually 
approach/take-off paths could be defined that are considerably narrower than 
the present ones so as to minimize the airspace necessary compared to the 
present standards for traditional planes. 
The areas destined for the transition phase will have to be reserved 
areas, in order to carry out the conversion from ordinary plane mode to that 
of HELO mode. This is to avoid interfering with the normal operations of 
fixed wing aircraft in departure/take-off or approach/landing on the main 
runways. It must, of course, be emphasized that such areas will be airspaces 
in which operations will strictly follow procedures. The capacity to land in 
IFR independently of the rest of the traffic is an essential requisite in order to 
increase airspace capacity. Simultaneous, converging instrumental 
approaches without interference allow traffic to be sorted in the best possible 
way without extra work for ATC. 
The location of potential sites for these new means of transport must pay 
attention to three particular conditions: 
1. Maximum operational independence must be guaranteed; 
2. Shortening of transfer times to and from the tiltrotors, both for 
passengers in transit to and from other aircraft and for passengers 
departing or arriving, so as to optimize landside sorting; and 
3. Minimal acoustic impact on the surrounding territory (reason for 
locating within the airport itself). 
Little-used runways with a length of less than 5,900 feet, called stub 
runways (Stouffer, Johnson, & Gribko, 2001), are the most attractive for 
CTR traffic except in the cases where these runways were closed because of 
interference with the instrument landing system operations of traditional 
planes, in which case the inter-dependence could have a negative effect on 
the expansion of capacity. 
An alternative to the use of little-used runways would be the use of 
aprons and taxiways so as not to upset traffic on the flight runways. An 
attempt was made to identify areas outside airports but in many cases the 
surrounding zones were already occupied by residential or industrial 
installations which impeded the creation of exclusive CTR runways. In the 
cases in which it is possible to locate these areas, it is necessary to keep in 
mind the problems both of noise pollution and the distance of the CTR 
terminal from the main terminal, which should not be more than 5 NM in 
order to not compromise the benefits of using tiltrotors by excessive terminal 
transfer times. 
 
Airport reconfiguration 
Airport reconfiguration, with the hypothetical introduction of such 
machines, would include the opening or reallocation of runways or taxiways, 
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or even the building of new exclusive runways. The CTR can be used on 
almost all runways without difficulty, while traditional take-off aircraft must 
necessarily be used in airports with suitable runway characteristics and 
therefore with adequate space according to the type of aircraft. 
A NASA study (Johnson, Stouffer, Long & Gribko, 2001) tried to 
establish for several airports whether it had sufficient space to permit CTRs 
to operate independently of traditional traffic. This information is valuable 
due to the considerable increase in airport capacity that can be obtained in 
this way. The research took into consideration the infrastructural 
characteristics of the airport and the existing structures and the location and 
availability of areas for the new aircraft. The result is a scale of values for 
operating potential for those American airports at which 85% of passenger 
traffic movement takes place. The study concluded that only one airport out 
of the 63 studied did not possess the specific features necessary to permit 
CTRs and traditional planes to operate independently. The examined 
interventions and the respective number of airports for which they are 
feasible are shown on Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Comparing the tiltrotor to other conventional aircraft 
manufacturer CESSNA ATR BELL BELL-AGUSTA
model Citation 525 Bravo 42 412EP BA609
type turbojet turboprop rotorcraft tiltrotor
wingspan ft 52 82 - 59
length ft 46 75 43 43
max load pax 10 50 14 9
range NM 1.890 1.000 375 750
max cruising speed kts 400 300 125 275
min takeoff distance ft 3.400 4.800 0 0
min landing distance ft 3.000 3.600 0 0
MTOW kg 6.500 18.600 5.200 7.300
operational ceiling ft 18.000 25.000
approximate price M$ 4,4 (1997) 12,2 (1994) 4,9 (1999) 9 (1998)
administration $/h 231 645 433 355
crew $/h 270 534 202 202
maintenance $/h 383 485 362 294
fuel and oil $/h 314 725 186 203
total DOC $/h 1.197 2.389 1.182 1.053
IOC 20% $/h 1.436 2.866 1.418 1.264
IOC 30% $/h 1.556 3.105 1.537 1.369
IOC 40% $/h 1.676 3.344 1.655 1.474
breakeven fare $/paxh 259 104 183 254
DOC+IOC
DOC
 
MTOW – Maximum take-off weight DOC – Direct operating costs 
IOC – Indirect operating costs  ft. – feet 
pax – passengers   NM – nautical miles 
kts – knots    kg – kilograms 
M$ - millions of dollars U.S.  $/h – dollars per hour 
$/paxh – dollars per passenger per hour 
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The type of capacity increase considered is in terms of an increase in 
independent or dependent operations that allow an increase in the number of 
supplementary flights and that improve the time flow of other airports. The 
number of additional operations depends not only on the runway types, but 
especially on the layout of the whole airport infrastructure and the respective 
runway configurations. For example, a new independent runway can permit 
about 70 operations per hour, but if the runway is not completely 
independent that value decreases considerably. The FAA regulations 
establish that independence between two parallel runways takes place at the 
moment in which there is a distance of more than about 4,200 feet between 
them. If the distance is less then 4,200 feet, they are dependent runways on 
which operations are carried out under IFR control. Completely independent 
operations make the greatest contribution to an increase in capacity. This is 
realized when a new runway can be built at about one NM from preexisting 
runways so as to give approaching aircraft two parallel, simultaneous and 
completely separate approach routes. 
It is evident that the problem of insufficient airspace capacity can find 
an immediate solution in the operative use of new generation CTRs, 
rationalizing the use of traditional aircraft and adapting flight procedures for 
V/STOL, particularly in view of their future implementation in airports. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears clear how the problem of insufficient airspace capacity can be 
rationally faced. It means that starting from now the operational use of the 
new generation of craft must be programmed, rationalizing the use of 
existing aircraft and adapting flight procedures for rotating-wing craft 
especially in view of their future use in airports. 
The results coming from different studies must be kept in mind, 
particularly those indicating that the use of tiltrotors would represent a 
fraction of the cost of the necessary structural enlargements, but that if used 
correctly could lead to an increase in capacity equal to that obtainable from 
the building of a new runway, besides other effects such as increasing the 
number of available slots (quantifiable as 50% of arrivals and departures, 
40% during peak hours). 
In conclusion, the introduction of the new V/STOL can represent the 
least expensive, most efficacious and safest way of improving airspace 
flexibility and productivity by reducing delays and increasing capacity. 
It can be understood that the introduction of these craft and the parallel 
development of optimal procedures for their use together represent an 
optimization of the use of airspace capacity without involving 
disproportionate additional costs and at the same time leading to a significant 
improvement in airport performance. 
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Nevertheless, there is a great deal of skepticism on the part of ATC 
authorities and the airlines themselves of changing immediately to the use of 
tiltrotors. The airlines in particular, who would benefit only indirectly from 
an increase in airport capacity, need to thoroughly understand the simulation 
data and examine performance before placing orders that could turn out to be 
uneconomic. 
It is the opinion of the authors that if the tiltrotor’s passenger transport 
capacities are confirmed and models with a suitable capacity for commercial 
service are produced, the choice of these aircraft could be one of the best 
solutions to the often-posed question of how to improve airport congestion 
without extending the infrastructure. 
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APPENDIX 
 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
A/C  aircraft 
ATC  air traffic control 
CTOL  aircraft using conventional take-off and landing mechanisms 
CTR  civil tiltrotor 
DOC  direct operating costs 
ERICA  Enhanced Rotorcraft Innovative Concept Achievement 
EUROFAR European Future Advanced Rotocraft 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FATO  final approach and take-off area 
GPS  global positioning system 
HELO mode flying a V/STOL in helicopter mode 
IFR  instrumental flight rules 
IOC  indirect operating costs 
LTO  landing and take-off 
MTOW  maximum take-off weight 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NM  nautical miles 
pax  passengers 
SNI  simultaneous non-interfering  
STOL  short take-off and landing 
V/STOL  aircraft capable of vertical or short take-off and landing 
VTOL  vertical take-off and landing 
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ABSTRACT 
Air transportation plays an important role in the social and economic development 
of the global system and the countries that seek to participate in it.  As Africa seeks 
to take its place in the global economy, it is increasingly looking to aviation as the 
primary means of connecting its people and goods with the world.  It has been 
suggested that Africa as a continent needs to move toward a system of hubs to 
optimize its scarce resources.  Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, 
Kenya, is one of the airports in the eastern region of Africa that is seeking to fill this 
role.  This paper discusses the prospects for success and the challenges that it will 
need to overcome, including projections through 2020 for the growth in passenger 
and cargo traffic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Air transportation plays an important role in the social and economic 
development of the global system and the countries that seek to participate in 
it. According to the Air Transport Action Group, the world’s airlines carried 
over 1.8 billion passengers and 29 million tons of freight in 2004. The air 
transport industry as a whole provided over 28 million jobs directly and 
supported another 192 million in the travel and tourism industry. Air 
transport is one of the fastest growing sectors of the world economy, 
expanding 2.4 times above the Gross Domestic Product (Air Transport 
Action Group, 2000, 2005). Although the aviation industry has suffered from 
the combined effects of economic recession, Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome, war, and terrorist attacks (September 11, 2001, and later), traffic 
in all regions has returned to pre-September 11, 2001, levels and the global 
economy shows signs of continued growth (Air Transport Association, 
2002).  
One region that did not see a decline in air traffic following September 
11, 2001, was Africa which posted a 1.4 percent gain in 2001 and is expected 
to witness continued traffic growth for the foreseeable future (ICAO, 2002). 
A number of factors account for this growth.  First, Africa is the second 
largest continent in the world with a large population base that is separated 
by geographically challenging terrain.  Because of the “poor state of land 
transport and the enormous cost of addressing these deficiencies” 
(Abrahams, 2002. p. 3), aviation is seen as a particularly ideal means of 
connecting Africa with itself and the rest of the world (Rhoades, 2003). 
Second, it is estimated that less than one in every twenty Africans currently 
has access to air travel.  Thus, the potential for growth is substantial if the 
countries in the region can overcome the many barriers that exist today 
(Airports Company South Africa, 2004). These barriers include poverty, lack 
of aviation infrastructure, maintenance and financial support, safety and 
security concerns, and competition from non-African airlines (Abrahams, 
2002; Graham, 1995; Rhoades, 2003; World Bank Group, 2002). 
It has been suggested that Africa as a region must move toward a system 
of hubs “rather than the proliferation of competing yet unviable airport 
infrastructure across the continent…which detract from the much needed 
investment in other areas of development within African states” (Abrahams, 
2002, p. 7).  Further, traffic forecast would seem to indicate that three major 
hubs in Sub-Saharan Africa would be ideal for serving both international and 
regional needs.  Based on general air traffic patterns, these hubs would be 
located in Southern, Eastern, and Western Africa.  Johannesburg in South 
Africa appears to be the most likely candidate for Southern Africa.  The 
situation in Western and Eastern Africa is less clear (Abrahams, 2002). One 
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contender for Eastern Africa is Kenya. The major north-south and east-west 
air routes pass over the country at present and Kenya already possesses 
several international airports used for technical and refueling stops. This 
geographical advantage could help facilitate the development of one of 
Kenya’s airports as a regional hub and major player in transport 
development in the continent (USAID/REDSO/ESA, 2001).  
The objective of this paper is to discuss the development of Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport (JKIA) as a regional aviation hub within the airline 
context of a hub-and-spoke system itself. Existing patterns and forecasted 
trends in passenger and cargo traffic are examined as a means of assessing 
the possibilities of a viable hub. In addition, the regional competition faced 
by JKIA and the potential investment required are explored to understand 
some of the challenges facing JKIA efforts to establish itself as the premier 
Eastern African hub. 
HUB-AND-SPOKE CONCEPT 
Button (2002) has noted that “there is in fact no unique or even widely 
used, definition of what exactly constitutes a hub airport” (p. 179). It may be 
used to refer to a geographical area whose airport (or airports) enplane a 
significant number of passengers or cargo (Button, 2002; Wells, 1994). It 
may also be used to refer to the broader concept of a hub-and-spoke system.  
In such a system, the hub is the central point in a radial airline network. This 
network allows ‘an airline to increase frequency in thin markets by 
connecting the thin markets (the spokes) to a central airport (the hub), 
trading off the inconvenience of a stop and connection for greater frequency 
and the ability to match the right sized aircraft to each route (Taneja, 2003). 
Hubs are not unique to air transportation having application to any form of 
transportation that serves markets of varying sizes.  It is also not unique to 
the U.S. aviation system even though thirty years of deregulation have 
created a system in the U.S whereby most large carriers have created a series 
of hubs and feeder carriers (Button, 2002). Part of the observed difference 
between the U.S. system and the rest of the world is the different historical 
development of the industry.  In much of the rest of the world, countries 
established through consolidation a single large international flag-carrier that 
utilized that country’s national capital as the hub for an international route 
network (Graham, 1995). 
Button (2002) addresses a number of the cited problems with the hub-
and-spoke system including: a) the loss of direct service suffered by small 
communities; b) airport congestion; c) potentially higher fares resulting from 
airline concentration and control of hub markets; d) restriction of new 
entrants; and e) environmental damage, but concludes that the system is not 
inherently flawed and can result in wider choices and lower overall costs.  
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For the purpose of this discussion, the issue of congestion is a critical 
element in discussing potential hub airports since it relates directly to the 
question of infrastructure. Traffic at a true hub-and-spoke airport typically 
arrives and departs in a series of banks, that is, a number of different flights 
arrive at around the same time, connect to another flight and depart around 
the same time, hopefully with minimum delay. However, this strategy may 
lead to congestion in several areas: a) on the ground as passengers for 
various flights attempt to arrive (or depart) at around the same time; b) 
within the airport as peak volumes of passengers move from one area to 
another; and c) in the air as a number of aircraft try to use a limited amount 
of airspace.  
While debate is likely to continue over the costs and benefits of hub 
networks, there is general agreement that too many hubs for a carrier or a 
region is not economically viable (Shaw, 2004; Taneja, 2003). As already 
noted in the introduction, traffic patterns and forecasts seem to indicate that 
Africa would best be served with a system of three continental hubs in 
Southern, Western, and Eastern Africa (Abrahams, 2002). If this is true, the 
question now becomes which airport is best positioned to assume this role 
and what types of investment, infrastructure, and regulatory support will be 
required. Hub airports compete on a number of factors including “the 
number of destinations and frequency of the services offered, transfer times, 
comfort levels at airports, ticket prices charged by carriers, airport taxes, 
etc.” (Reitveld & Brons, 2001, p. 248). In international aviation, a hub 
airport serves as the home base for its national carrier as well as the arrival 
and departure point for international carriers as set out in the bilateral air 
service agreements between nations.  The strength of the home carrier as 
well as the nature of the bilateral air service agreements with other nations 
will effect the destinations and frequency at the airport.  Transfer times are 
another important issue for hub (or potential) hub airports. If congestion 
creates delays that result in missed connections, then passengers are likely to 
choose other travel routing, particularly if limited flight schedules result in 
extended stays for rebooking. Inadequate seating in airports, lack of facilities 
for dining, shopping, etc., become important to passengers waiting for 
connections.  Ticket prices can also affect customer trip selection.  The 
President of the African Civil Aviation Commission recently acknowledged 
that in order to find an affordable fare from one African capital to another 
many passengers were forced to fly to Europe and back on a European 
carrier (Africa must open the skies, 2005).  From an airline (and indirectly a 
passenger or shipper) perspective, airport taxes, gate fees, and fuel prices are 
additional considerations.  In short, many factors will influence the behavior 
or passengers, shippers, and airlines in selecting trip routing.  The successful 
hub must attempt to address the concerns of all major stakeholders. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF AIR TRANSPORT IN KENYA 
Air transport has, in the recent past, gained popularity among the 
residents of Kenya and is no longer considered as a reserve for rich 
foreigners and senior government officials. There are new trends in the 
country, as elsewhere in Africa, which will create opportunities for aviation 
to thrive. These opportunities include a huge population, the vast physical 
size of the country, inadequate surface transportation, emerging commercial 
links with the outside world, and the low level of development of the country 
leading to great potential once the development process begins 
(USAID/REDSO/ESA, 2001). As in other developing countries, air 
transportation was imposed wholly from outside the country. Similarly, the 
spatial pattern of important routes emerged early and has remained basically 
the same, with the majority of the air routes geared to Europe and Asia. The 
existing pattern of air transportation network in Kenya, like that of the rest 
Africa can be traced from the colonial origins of the international network 
(Hogenauer, 1975).  
 
Scheduled domestic air transport services 
Domestic air transport services began in Kenya soon after World War I 
with the first air passenger services offered by Wilson Airways, a private 
airline established in 1929. This transport company had its headquarters in 
Mombasa. In August 1932, Wilson Airways introduced regular passenger 
services between Nairobi and Dar es Salaam through Zanzibar, Tanga and 
Mombasa on a weekly basis. The inauguration of this service offered the 
first inter-territorial (regional) communication linking East African towns 
with the main Imperial Airways Trans-Africa (Cairo-Cape Town) route. 
Later in the year, Wilson Airways launched another weekly service, this time 
to Entebbe through Nakuru, Kisumu and Jinja. This marked the development 
of the first international air routes in East Africa. With the outbreak of World 
War II in 1939, the airline was liquidated. The East African Airways 
Corporation (EAAC), a regional airline operated by the three East African 
countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, replaced it in January 1946. 
EAAC operated until 1977 when the East African Community collapsed. 
The demise of EAAC led to the development of national carriers such as the 
Kenya Airways, Air Tanzania and Uganda Airlines.  
Currently, domestic air transportation in Kenya serves the tourism 
industry by transporting tourists to and from Mombasa, Nairobi and other 
tourist sites such as the Maasai Mara, Mt. Kenya, Malindi, Western Kenya 
and Lake Turkana region. Air passenger services are operated to and from 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Malindi, Lokichogio and Maasai Mara 
among other destinations. Certain areas in the northern and eastern parts of 
Kenya have low levels of accessibility by road and are totally lacking in 
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railway transportation (Irandu, 1995). Aviation is also important in the 
transportation of perishable horticultural products, fish and other meat 
products to overseas market. 
 
Scheduled international air transport services 
International air passenger services in Kenya were established during 
the 1930s. The services were provided by the Imperial Airways the 
forerunner of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC). In January 
1932, Imperial Airways started the London-Cape Town service which 
initially passed through Mwanza but was later changed to pass through 
Nairobi. Imperial Airways merged with BOAC in April 1940. With the 
attainment of independence, Kenya renegotiated all the Bilateral Air Service 
Agreements previously entered into on her behalf by the then colonial 
government of the United Kingdom. This involved the review of traffic 
rights for all scheduled foreign airlines operating into and out of Kenya. On 
February 4, 1977, Kenya established its own airline, Kenya Airways (KQ) to 
provide both domestic and international scheduled services. Together with 
its partner KLM, KQ provides the highest service frequencies to Europe 
from Nairobi via Amsterdam’s Schipol hub. The two airlines provide 
convenient and regular connections to continental Europe, North America 
and the rest of Africa. 
By 1987, Kenya had more inter-Africa connections than other nations in 
Africa when the Yamoussoukro Declaration on a New African Air Transport 
Policy—established in 1988—committed African nations to total integration 
of their airlines through the liberal exchange of air service rights, unbiased 
computer reservation systems, and joint infrastructure projects. 
Unfortunately, there has not yet been any significant implementation of this 
policy. International air traffic in Africa continues to be concentrated on a 
few large airports with intercontinental connections and limited feeder lines 
from other African capitals. Between 1986 and 1996, Johannesburg, Nairobi 
and Dakar developed into the most important international hubs in sub-
Saharan Africa (Pedersen 2000). In terms of inter-African connections, 
Johannesburg has become the most important hub. However, its location 
further south puts it at a disadvantageous position compared to Nairobi, 
which has served as a gateway to parts of Africa south of the Sahara. Nairobi 
also has a greater frequency of flights to cities such as Dar es Salaam, 
Entebbe, Lusaka or Harare. Nairobi’s location vis-à-vis the principal north-
south alignment between Europe and Southern Africa requires little 
deviation in terms of route kilometers flown and yet offers a convenient 
stopover for passengers, freight and fuel. 
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Air transport infrastructure 
The growth of air traffic in Kenya after independence has led to rapid 
development of airport infrastructure. Numerous airports and airstrips have 
been developed. Today, the country has about 568 aerodromes spread all 
over the country, including national parks and game reserves. About 160 of 
them are public aerodromes manned by Kenya Airports Authority (KAA), a 
parastatal that was established by an Act of Parliament in 1991. There are 
different categories of airports, with each having different requirements for 
communications, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management 
facilities and equipment. These are international airports such as JKIA and 
Moi International Airport (MIA); Category A aerodromes such as Wilson 
and Malindi. Categories B and C are aerodromes and airstrips. Examples of 
Category B airports include Keekorok, Wajir and Voi while Category C 
include local airstrips found in national parks and game reserves throughout 
the country. International Airports operate 24 hours a day with aircraft 
landing and taking off any time. Category A airports operate 12 hours a day, 
usually between 6:30 a.m. and 8:30 p.m. Categories B and C operate during 
daylight hours only from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The three international 
airports in the country also have the basic infrastructure needed for airports 
according to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Air Safety 
Standards. These include Instrument Landing System for night landing a 
Very High Frequency (VHF) control tower to enable the air traffic controller 
to see the whole airport and radar surveillance of a bigger area. Category A 
(domestic airports) use VHF and air field lighting for communicating. 
Smaller airports use locaters such as VHF omni-range or Non-Directional 
Beacons or Distance Measuring Equipment. Out of 568 airports in the area 
only seven are manned. These are JKIA, MIA, Eldoret International Airport, 
Wilson, Malindi, Kisumu and Lokichogio. The rest of the aerodromes are 
unmanned and lack navigation equipment and proper maintenance.  
Today, Kenya has a relatively well-developed air transport industry with 
three international airports in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Eldoret and four main 
domestic airports at Wilson, Malindi, Kisumu, and Lokichogio. Of the 
domestic airports, Wilson generally records the largest number of aircraft 
movements because it serves as the base for domestic charter planes to and 
from the National Parks and Game Reserves dotting the country. It also 
handles aircraft taking relief aid to neighbouring countries such as Sudan, 
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Airfreight traffic has 
increased rapidly in the country over the years, particularly the export of 
high quality horticultural produce. At the domestic-only airports, domestic 
cargo is dominant. For example, at Kisumu airport, domestic cargo accounts 
for 97 percent of the total cargo handled (USAID/REDSO/ESA, 2001). 
Currently, most of domestic cargo in Kenya is carried by roads or railways 
as air transport is expensive and not well developed. International airfreight 
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is dominant at the international airports such as JKIA and MIA. According 
to a recent survey, the Europe-African southbound air freight grew by 14.4 
percent in 2004 while the northbound market grew at 3.4 percent (Clancy & 
Hoppin, 2005).   
As already discussed, most aerodromes in the country are poorly 
maintained and lack essential navigation aids. Some of the crucial air 
transport infrastructure such as control towers and buildings housing radar 
stations are in a sorry state and require urgent rehabilitation (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, 2003). Poor infrastructure and services such 
as roads, electricity, information technology and water and sanitation 
services are still poor in most airports. Sufficient and effective linkages 
between airports and other transport modes such as railways and roads are 
lacking.  Roads linking airports at present are in a bad state of repair and 
public bus services are poorly developed and infrequent. A case in point is 
JKIA, which has only one bus service (Route 34) and the buses using the 
airport route are often overcrowded.   
 
Facilities and capacity at JKIA 
JKIA is Kenya’s premier airport and is increasingly growing in status as 
an international aviation hub in East Africa, handling substantially more 
passengers than either Entebbe or Kotoka (Table 1). At present, JKIA 
handles about 60 percent of the total visitors to Kenya by air. The airport 
was initially equipped to international standards with a handling capacity of 
2.5 million passengers per annum and about 200,000 tons of cargo per year.  
The airport has already exceeded its planned maximum capacity for handling 
passengers. The airport now handles on average about 4 million passengers 
per year (Table 1). KAA manages JKIA like other airports in Kenya. Tables 
1 and 2 compare passenger volume and aircraft movements for JKIA, 
Entebbe and Kotoka airports. Table 3 compares air cargo traffic for JKIA, 
Entebbe and Kotoka airports while Table 4 presents cargo throughput for 
selected international airports throughout Africa. According to Table 4, 
Nairobi is ranked second to Johannesburg in terms of the volume of cargo 
handled.  JKIA handles about 130,000 tons of cargo per year. This 
constitutes about 65 percent of its planned cargo capacity 
(USAID/REDSO/ESA, 2001). 
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Table 1. A comparison of passenger throughput* at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport 
(Nairobi, Kenya), Entebbe International Airport (Entebee, Uganda) and Kotoka 
International Airport (Accra, Ghana), 1996-2004 (in thousands). 
 
Year JKIA Entebbe Kotoka 
1996 2,677 325 402 
1997 2,551 356 429 
1998 2,350 367 484 
1999 2,668 377 554 
2000 2,945 373 592 
2001     -   - 622 
2002 3,053   - 636 
2003 3,451 494 756 
2004 4,000 544 806 
* Includes total domestic and international passengers 
Source: Airports Council International. (2005). 2004 Worldwide airport traffic report. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
Table 2. A comparison of numbers of aircraft movements* at Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport (Nairobi, Kenya), Entebbe International Airport (Entebee, Uganda) 
and Kotoka International Airport (Accra, Ghana), 1996-2004. 
Year JKIA Entebbe Kotoka 
1996 41,549 15,624 6,664 
1997 42,191 15,057 6,209 
1998 41,528 17,038 7,210 
1999 45,576 17,806 9,107 
2000 46,808 16,190 10,414 
2001      -      - 9,064 
2002 49,897      - 8,161 
2003 58,588 26,116 11,701 
2004 59,927 26,265 11,852 
* Includes total domestic and international movements 
Source: Airports Council International. (2005). 2004 Worldwide airport traffic report. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
Table 3. A comparison of air cargo traffic* at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport 
(Nairobi, Kenya), Entebbe International Airport (Entebbe, Uganda) and Kotoka 
International Airport (Accra, Ghana), 1996-2004 (in metric tons). 
Year JKIA Entebbe Kotoka 
1996 74,963 27,010 37,045 
1997 75,690 26,926 37,623 
1998 116,205 30,967 45,767 
1999 125,552 25,633 46,757 
2000 139,619 26,015 46,826 
2001     -    - 44,779 
2002 168,803    - 40,877 
2003 166,517 36,617 47,667 
2004 183,470 48,585 46,918 
* Includes total domestic and international cargo 
Source: Airports Council International. (2005). 2004 Worldwide airport traffic report. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
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Table 4.  International cargo traffic for top 20 airports in Africa, 2003 (in metric tons). 
Ranks in Africa World Rank Airport Traffic (tones) 
1.  62 Johannesburg 262,151 
2.  85 Nairobi (JKIA) 173,926 
3.  - Cairo 166,056 
4.  116 Luanda 117,143 
5.  163 Lagos 55,496 
6.  151 Kinshasa 51,183 
7.  180 Accra 47,667 
8.  187 Casablanca 44,834 
9.  202 Entebbe 36,617 
10.  224 St. Denis-Gillot 29,705 
11.  226 Brazzaville 29,294 
12.  251 Algiers 21,942 
13.  255 Addis Ababa 20,875 
14.  269 Lusaka 18,224 
15.  271 Tunis 18,189 
16.  284 Doula 15,958 
17.  287 Libreville 15,768 
18.  288 Abidjan 15,727 
19.  294 Antananarivo 14,835 
20.  301 Mwanza 13,702 
       Source: Air Cargo World. (2004), Top Airports, International Edition, p. 22 
 
TRAFFIC GROWTH AND FORECAST 
Growth of passenger traffic  
One thing that needs to be noted is the holiday or tourist nature of the 
majority of visitors to Kenya by all means of transport (King, 1984). For 
example, in 1987, such visitors accounted for about 63 percent of the 
arrivals. In 2002, the visitors on holiday accounted for 75 percent of the total 
departing visitors. Over 90 percent of Kenya’s holiday visitors arrive by air 
with most of them arriving in Nairobi (JKIA) on scheduled flights (World 
Tourism Organization, 2002b). 
According to a recent forecast by the World Tourism Organization 
(WTO), Africa should be able to triple the size of its tourism industry by 
2020 if proper efforts are made to ensure safety and security of visitors 
(2000a). The number of tourist arrivals in the continent is forecast to reach 
77.3 million in 2020, up from 27.8 million in 2000 (WTO, 2000a). Most of 
the tourists will be heading to South Africa. Tourist arrivals in South Africa 
will grow by 10.4 percent per annum and will increase to 36 million by 2020 
up from 6 million in 2000. East Africa will be the other major growth region, 
with the number of arrivals increasing at 6.0 percent annually. This means 
that the estimated tourist arrivals will increase to 17 million in 2020. Table 5 
shows the trend in tourism arrivals for 1996-2000.  It should be noted that 
international tourist arrivals fell worldwide in 2001 by 1.3 percent, the first 
60 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
decline in international tourism arrivals since World War II (WTO, 2002a). 
Data suggests that Kenya’s tourism industry will continue to play a vital role 
in JKIA efforts to establish itself as an international aviation hub in Eastern 
Africa. Further, a decline in tourist traffic would result in far fewer flight 
operations and could reduce air traffic to levels lower than those of Entebbe, 
Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa (King, 1984; WTO, 2002b). 
Table 5. African tourist arrivals, 1996-2000. 
Country                               Tourist Arrivals (in thousands) 
 1996       1997        1998          1999          2000 
South Africa 5,186      5,170       5,,898        6,026         6,000 
Tunisia 3,986      4,392        4,831         5,000           --- 
Egypt 3,896      3,961       3,454         4,489         5,506 
Morocco 2,856      3,203       3,414         4,088         4,293 
Zimbabwe 1,597      1,336       2,090         2,250         1,967  
Kenya 1,003      1,001         894            969          1,037 
Algeria   605          635         678            749            866 
Botswana   656          765         940          1,051          --- 
Nigeria 1,230       1,292       1,357        1,425         1,492 
Namibia    525            571          ---           580           --- 
Source: World Tourism Organization. (2002): Compendium of Tourism Statistics. Madrid, 
Spain.  
Growth of cargo traffic 
Africa accounts for approximately 3.5 percent of the world’s air cargo 
traffic in terms of tonnage and 4.4 percent in terms of tonne-kilometers. The 
total international flows of cargo moving into, within and out of Africa 
totaled approximately 961,000 tons in 2001, with Europe accounting for 65 
percent of all African foreign air trade. Europe’s dominance of market share 
can be explained by the region’s proximity to Africa and long standing 
historical ties going back to the colonial days. While Europe once held parity 
in northbound and southbound tonnage, the market between the two regions 
is now slightly imbalanced as African air exports exceed air imports in total 
tonnage by a ratio of about 3 to 2. 
African air exports—especially perishables—have made significant 
inroads in European market since the mid 1990s. The exports to Europe 
primarily consist of perishables such as fruits, vegetables, cut flowers and 
fish. Some textiles and express documents are also exported by air. African 
air imports from Europe primarily consist of specially manufactured goods, 
components and peripherals, express documents, machinery, transport 
equipment and spare parts. In Kenya, air exports have experienced a 
remarkable growth in the last ten or so years. Exports pf fresh horticultural 
products through JKIA have increased from 57,383 tons in 1992 to about 
139,619 tons in 2000 (KAA, 2001, USAID/REDSO/ESA, 2001). An 
examination of Table 3 shows that there has been an increase in airfreight 
handled at JKIA during the study period. 
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Traffic forecast 
Based on data obtained primarily from the Kenya Civil Aviation 
Authority offices, KAA and airlines operating into and out of Nairobi and 
interviews held with key informants in the Ministry of Transport, projections 
were  made for departing visitors, aircraft movements, and passenger/cargo 
traffic through 2020. Index Numbers were used to show whether the volume 
of cargo throughout has been increasing at the airport or not. Time Series 
Analysis is used to reveal the future trend of aircraft numbers, passenger and 
cargo throughout in the next five to twenty years. A linear trend curve was 
used to forecast aircraft movements and volume of passenger and cargo 
traffic at JKIA. The nature of the trend curve used is determined by using the 
mathematical formula shown below: 
Y = a + bT 
Where:     Y is volume of traffic (e.g., cargo) 
           T is number of years 
           a and b are constants representing the intercept and the slope                  
respectively. 
 
The trend curve assumes a constant annual increase in traffic level and 
decreasing rate of growth.     
The trend curves reveal that growth in aircraft movements, passenger 
and cargo traffic have not been characterized by random fluctuations from 
year to year. It is apparent that as demand for air travel and air trade 
increased, so do the number of aircraft movements increase. Using the trend 
curves, projections for aircraft movements, passenger and cargo traffic were 
made for the period 2005-2020. Based on the trend curves, JKIA is likely to 
experience a major increase in the volume of passenger and cargo traffic 
leading to an increase in demand for more aircraft movements. Aircraft 
movements are expected to increase from 55,000 in 2005 to 78,000 in 2020 
while passenger traffic will increase from 3.4 million in 2005 to slightly over 
4.9 million in 2020. Cargo traffic is expected to see even greater increases as 
it nearly doubles from 160,000 tons to almost 280,000 tons in 2020. 
Consequently, the airport authorities have to expand and modernize JKIA if 
it is expected to handle efficiently such large volumes of traffic in the future. 
Any congestion at the airport would lead air operators to shift to other more 
efficient airports in the region. 
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CONCLUSION 
Air transport in Kenya, like elsewhere in the developing countries, was 
introduced from outside. By the time the country attained independence in 
1963, it was well linked with its former colonial master, through British 
Airways and several other foreign airlines operated into and out of Nairobi. 
EAAC, owed by the three East African states, provided regional services as 
well as international flights into and out of Nairobi. The rapid growth of air 
traffic in Kenya after independence has led to development of several major 
airports and numerous airstrips dotting the whole country. Many of the 
airstrips are found in National Parks and Game Reserves distributed 
throughout the country.  
Today, Kenya possesses three international airports, the most important 
in terms of passenger and cargo traffic handled being JKIA. In 2003, JKIA 
was ranked 85th in size among world airports and 2nd in Africa after 
Johannesburg in terms of cargo traffic (Table 3). JKIA has grown into a 
major regional hub airport in Eastern Africa due to its geographical position 
and the large number of international airlines operating into and out of the 
airport.  
As already discussed, most of the foreign visitors passing through JKIA 
are tourists. At present, the country continues to be one of the top 
destinations in Africa. Since the tourism industry is predicted to grow rapidly 
in East Africa in the next twenty years, the region is likely to witness a 
significant increase in tourist arrivals by 2020. JKIA has already exceeded its 
planned passenger handling capacity. The planned cargo capacity will also 
be soon exceeded. This will force airline operators to relocate to other 
airports in the region that are already expanding to cope with increasing 
passenger and cargo traffic.  JKIA faces several additional problems that 
need to be addressed if the airport is to compete with other regional air hubs 
in Africa such as Entebbe, Addis Ababa and Johannesburg, namely aviation 
safety and security. If these issues and airport infrastructure are addressed, 
there is no doubt JKIA can become an aviation hub in eastern and central 
Africa. 
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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
IN AVIATION 
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ABSTRACT 
The dialog within aviation management education regarding ethics is incomplete 
without a discussion of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR research 
requires discussion involving: (a) the current emphasis on CSR in business in 
general and aviation specifically; (b) business and educational theory that provide a 
basis for aviation companies to engage in socially responsible actions; (c) 
techniques used by aviation and aerospace companies to fulfill this responsibility; 
and (d) a glimpse of teaching approaches used in university aviation management 
classes. The summary of this research suggests educators explain CSR theory and 
practice to students in industry and collegiate aviation management programs. 
Doing so extends the discussion of ethical behavior and matches the current high 
level of interest and activity within the aviation industry toward CSR.  
 
I think many people assume, wrongly, that a company exists simply to make money. …A group 
of people get together and exist as an institution that we call a company so that…they make a 
contribution to society, a phrase which sounds trite but is fundamental. 
 David Packard, cofounder of Hewitt Packard (Handy, 2003, p. 80). 
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improving the educational process for aviation students.  
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INTRODUCTION 
CSR currently an important business topic  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a subject of much current 
interest within the managerial world. (CSR is also frequently described as 
social responsibility or community relations.) Last year corporations 
voluntarily contributed more than $3.6 billion to various social endeavors. 
The amount of charitable contributions has increased yearly since 1987 
(Renz & Lawrence, 2005). A press release from the Center on Philanthropy 
(2005, February 25) states that American non-government donations to the 
Southeast Asia tsunami disaster totaled more than a billion dollars.  A 
PricewaterhouseCoopers global survey indicates a priority of chief 
executives is “maintaining a high degree of corporate responsibility” 
(Verschoor, 2003, p. 20). In the last 24 months the Harvard Business Review 
produced 16 featured articles about CSR (Harvard Business Online, 2005, 
June 10). The Economist ran a special feature surveying CSR practices in 
January 2005 (Good company, 2005, January 22). The article states, “Big 
firms nowadays are called upon to be good corporate citizens, and they all 
want to show that they are” (p. 3).  A search for Wall Street Journal articles 
containing corporate social responsibility in the last 12 months results in 78 
articles (Wall Street Journal Online, 2006) and a weekly feature titled 
“Giving Back” was started April 1, 2005, because of the editors’ belief in the 
high level of reader interest in philanthropy (E. Bernstein, personal 
communication, June 13, 2005). The weekly articles discuss some aspect of 
social responsibility actions including the “Gift of the Week” (Bernstein, 
2005, June).   
Half the attendees of the January 2005 World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland, were from businesses including 500 Chairmen and 
CEOs (Stephens, 2005, January 31). Meeting sessions included CSR topics: 
“Does business have a noble purpose;” “How Responsible is Responsible 
Enough;” “Using private resources to deliver public good;” and “Is 
responsible investment about to payoff” (World Economic Forum, 2005). 
CSR is currently a key subject for business leaders! 
 
CSR extends the ethics discussion 
The Journal of Air Transportation published a series of four articles in 
the past three years discussing ethics in university aviation management 
programs in the US (Oderman, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). The 2002 article 
received the Sorenson Best Paper Award. This history suggests that ethics is 
an important issue in the aviation education community. The ethics 
discussion is incomplete without specifically including CSR.  
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A review of basic management texts demonstrates consistent 
introduction of CSR (or social responsibility) not as a singular subject but 
combined with ethics. Bateman and Snell (2004), Certo (2000), Daft and 
Marcic (2004), DuBrin and Ireland (1993), and Williams (2005), all have a 
chapter titled “Ethics and Corporate Responsibility” in their books. Jones, 
George, and Hill (2000) combine ethics, social responsibility and diversity in 
a single chapter. Griffin (1997) and Robbins and Decenzo (2004) combine 
ethics and social responsibility as a singular subject in chapters with other 
subjects. The two concepts, ethics and social responsibility are directly and 
closely linked. 
 
Perspective 
The focus of this research is on for-profit organizations in the aviation 
arena. Boeing, Lockheed, Hawaiian Airlines, and Northwest Airlines are 
examples. The corporate charter of these organizations creates an 
expectation that they obey the law and make a profit for owners.  
Non-profit organizations also volunteer to assist society beyond the 
scope of their basic mission.  Two examples include the women and men of 
one of the Navy Reserve air squadrons at the now defunct Glenview Naval 
Air Station, working with former Eastern Airline flight attendants, who for 
many years provided an annual Christmas flight for young children with 
severe diseases. Also, the Volunteer Pilots Association provides 
transportation for children needing medical attention. Other non-profit 
groups in the aviation community are the Association of Flight Attendants  
and Air Line Pilots Association and the Federal employees of the Air Traffic 
Control Center at Oberlin, Ohio. Members of these organizations may 
participate in voluntary community activity working on a union (and not a 
company) sponsored activity.  Although these and other non-profit 
organizations might act in socially responsible ways beyond their basic 
purpose, they are not included in this project. The focus is on for-profit 
businesses. 
The intended audience falls into two categories. First are educators, both 
in academia and industry. Students of these individuals may be college 
aviation management majors or new supervisors or foremen in a 
management skills class. The second category is individuals who are 
interested in the basic business of management in the aviation environment. 
The intent is to provide both groups with knowledge that improves their 
understanding of business practices and the philosophy behind those 
practices. Although business sponsored social responsibility activity occurs 
on a global basis, this research is limited to practices and policies within the 
United States aviation industry.  
An in-depth review of the legal and political action aspects of CSR is 
purposefully omitted from this study. The legal history is traceable to a 1916 
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suit challenging Henry Ford’s efforts to make his cars more affordable to the 
public at a detriment to corporate profit. The court found his actions 
improper. It was not until the 1950s that CSR efforts as practiced today 
became legal (Smith, 2003). Aviation companies and their unions have 
active political action committees. This is a form of social responsibility not 
often associated with CSR but deserves attention at a later time. 
 
Definitions 
The constructs ethics and CSR are difficult to define succinctly but are 
key terms of this article and therefore require a working definition between 
the readers and the author. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ethics as 
“relating to morals” and “the science of morals” (Oxford English Dictionary, 
2006a), Morality is defined as “ethical wisdom, knowledge of moral 
science” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006b.). The Miriam-Webster OnLine 
(2006a) uses ethical as a synonym for moral, and moral (2006b) as a 
synonym for ethical. It appears that in common usage the terms ethics and 
morals are interchangeable.  
Oderman states “ethics deals with standards of conduct” (2002, p. 8). 
Daft and Marcic (2004) describe personal behavior (what people actually do) 
on a behavioral continuum. One end is guided by explicit law and regulation 
through which society has specifically defined acceptable conduct and the 
range of penalties if an individual does not comply. The other end of the 
continuum is freewill or free choice. Does it really matter if you choose to 
put grape jelly or orange marmalade on your peanut butter and jelly 
sandwich?  In the middle of these extremes society relies on individuals 
deciding to act in a manner consistent with implicit social rules and 
judgments. Oderman’s description of ethics fits this middle area of the 
continuum. Decisions and actions that fall between the law and freewill are 
evaluated by society’s mostly implicit ethical standards. 
Ethics is not what some individuals, often politicians, make it to be.  
Last year all Illinois state employees, including professors, were required to 
complete an online ethics training program. One of the key messages of the 
program is to obey the law. Breaking the law is not an ethical decision, or as 
described by Oderman, a decision determining a standard of conduct. 
Society took the decision out of the individual domain when the law or 
regulation was created. Not following the law is an issue of criminality, not 
ethics.   
The definition used in this article is based on the above and is: ethics is 
the philosophical process of deciding how to act and making moral 
judgments about the action taken. Acting ethically, being ethical, refers to 
actions that the self and/or members of society find more acceptable than 
unacceptable.  
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CSR, like ethics, has no universal definition. Approaches include “a 
manager’s duty or obligation to make decisions that nurture, protect, enhance 
and promote the welfare and well-being of stakeholders and society as a 
whole” (Jones, George, and Hill, 2000, p. 160). (The term stakeholder 
appears frequently in CSR literature and refers to shareholders, employees, 
customers, and society in general including both the human and physical 
environment.) Another description is “the obligation toward society assumed 
by business” (Bateman and Snell, 2004, p. 147).  Since 2002 the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) has been working toward an ISO 
standard for CSR. The ISO Bulletin refers to CSR as “the values and 
standards by which business operates” (Spotlight, 2002, July, p. 7). Daft and 
Marcic suggest that CSR is “management’s obligation to make choices and 
take actions that will contribute to the welfare and interests of society as well 
as the organization” (2004, p. 123).  John Copeland, the Executive in 
Residence at the Soderquist Center for Leadership and Ethics (Soderquist 
Center, 2005) stated in an interview that CSR is “really defined more as 
corporate citizenship” (Maxwell, 2004, p. 5). 
In this article the assumption is that an organization exists first for the 
economic benefit of the owners and employees. Helping society beyond that 
objective is considered a secondary responsibility. This leads to the 
definition: CSR is both the philosophy and practice of for-profit 
organizations voluntarily acting to positively assist society in ways beyond 
that required to obtain profit objectives. 
 
Overview 
Sections that follow include a theoretical grounding of social 
responsibility, CSR practices in aviation, and current academic teaching 
practices. Eight recommendations for classroom consideration are presented 
as a conclusion. 
GROUNDING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Using the umbrella of grounded theory this section describes the roots of 
social responsibility from the perspective of business and education, offers 
reasons for and against social responsibility. Three tools are provided for 
review of CSR practices. 
 
Business theory 
Arguably the foremost management thinker of the past sixty years is 
Peter Drucker. He states that the institution of management has three tasks: 
(a) increase economic performance; (b) make the worker productive and 
efficient; and (c) manage social impacts and responsibilities (Drucker, 1954). 
He theorizes that institutions do not exist by themselves; they are an organ of 
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society. The business enterprise must have “…concern for the quality of life, 
that is, for the physical, human, and social environment of modern man and 
modern community” (Drucker, 2001, p. 17).  
This view is echoed more recently in the Harvard Business Review 
compilation of articles regarding CSR. Porter and Kramer state “companies 
do not function in isolation from society around them” (2003, p. 32). Handy, 
in the same series, explains that modern business depends more on employee 
time and talent than on stockholders’ equity. He adds that successful 
companies depend on “a community with a purpose” and “not just making a 
profit but to make a profit in order to do something better” (2003, p. 66).  He 
suggests that companies which forget the community and concentrate only 
on profits will die (the entropy principle of General Systems Theory).  
CSR is based on ethical theory and morality. “A corporation can and 
should have a conscience,” and “the language of ethics has a place in the 
vocabulary of an organization” (Goodpaster and Matthews 2003, p. 134). 
They describe both the complexity and benefit of this concept when 
suggesting that individuals guided by morality may not always agree on 
issues, but “at least have a basis for dialogue” (p. 138). In summary, 
management theory suggests profit making corporations are a part of and 
have the responsibility to support society beyond paying employees and 
making a profit for owners. 
 
The role of education 
Just as Drucker is a major voice in management theory, John Dewey has 
a major influence on educational theory. Dewey wrote in the School Journal, 
January 1897, that education is the “fundamental method of social progress 
and reform” (Boydston, 1972, p. 93) and that a teacher is responsible for the 
formation of the “proper social life” (p. 95). Those involved in aviation 
management education are preparing individuals to obtain jobs or improve 
performance in new or existing positions. Dewey indicates that, “An 
occupation is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacity of an 
individual with his social service” (Dewey, 1916, p. 308). There is a 
historical track of educators supporting Dewey’s views. Recent support is 
offered by David Pierce. As the then President of the American Association 
of Community Colleges, he describes what society demands of higher 
education: 
To train a skilled, intelligent, creative, and 
responsible workforce. …To support a citizenry 
that participates responsibly in community affairs 
including public governance and cares about our 
country and the world. …To be a resource for 
people searching for ideas and information on 
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solving social, economic, political, and scientific 
problems (1993). 
 
The conclusion easily reached is that the purpose of the education 
process is to prepare students interested and capable of helping solve 
society’s problems. A challenging task! 
 
Social responsibility is a good thing 
Benefits of social responsibility include the following.  
1. It is a cost effective way for an organization to improve its 
competitive position through advertising the good deeds of the 
organization. A 2002 survey indicates 84% of Americans would likely 
switch to a brand associated with a good cause if price and quality were 
similar (Comiteau, 2003, p. 24). 
2. Protecting the environment leads to more productive use of resources 
(Porter and Kramer, 2003). 
3. Boosting social conditions, including education, leads to improved 
locations for company operations and potential creation of customers 
and skilled workers (Porter and Kramer, 2003). 
4.  Investors are drawn to socially responsible companies (Stock, 2003).  
5. Individual professionals who perform charitable volunteer work are 
recognized and receive personal benefits for their efforts (Hall, 2003). 
 
This list of reasons why CSR is a good thing includes tangible benefits 
for organizations and individuals. It does not rely on philosophical attitudes. 
 
Social responsibility is a bad thing 
Milton Friedman’s New York Times Magazine article of September 13, 
1970, remains the focus of the view against CSR. In it he argues that social 
responsibility is an individual and not an institutional responsibility and to 
suggest otherwise is socialism (Friedman, 1970). He suggests that executives 
who spend corporate dollars on social programs are unfairly taxing 
shareholders and customers by using their dollars without permission. The 
title of the piece eloquently summarizes his view, The Social Responsibility 
of Business is to Increase Its Profits. Such a view rules out any action that is 
not seen to directly lead toward profitability.   
Another classic article of the 1970s is Levinson’s Management by 
Whose Objectives (Levinson, 1970). He describes the frustration of an 
individual who on one hand is responsible to create profits but on the other 
must achieve other objectives which detract from bottom line performance. 
This is the quandary described by Friedman.  
A January 2005 Economist article (apparently written by an editorial 
team) argues that another issue is questionable corporate commitment to 
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social responsibility. They posit that CSR is cosmetic, that “the human face 
that CSR applies to capitalism goes on each morning, gets increasingly 
smeared by day and washes off at night” (Good company, 2005, p. 4). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many students agree with this view. 
Classroom comments often suggest companies only do good things for 
selfish benefit and not for the purpose of doing good.  
Our society includes conflicting views on essentially every subject. 
Many believe strongly that CSR is a bad thing. Their arguments have 
persuasive logic and deserve consideration before reaching an independent 
decision for or against CSR. 
 
A visual hierarchy 
Three options are offered as potentially helpful tools by which to view 
business activity. Each or all of these tools may be used to evaluate social 
actions of aviation companies. Figure 1 is Johnson’s (2003) Corporate 
Social Responsibility Continuum. He suggests five levels of support. (The 
levels offered are Johnson’s; the description is this author’s synopsis of 
Johnson’s discussion.) 
Figure 1. Johnson’s corporate social responsibility continuum 
Level 5 Social Advocacy A company should be good regardless of the financial 
consequences. 
 
Level 4 Strategic Consistently support positive social actions with a clear 
understanding of the financial benefits. 
Level 3 Fragmented A mixed and inconsistent approach to social responsiveness. 
Level 2 Compliant Minimal compliance with laws and regulations. 
Level 1 Illegal/irresponsible At least some if not consistent conscious violation of the law. 
Source: Johnson, H. H. (2003). Does it pay to be good? Social responsibility and financial 
performance. Business Horizons, 46(6), p. 36 
 
Figure 2 is an attempt to represent the continuum of behavior suggested 
by Daft and Marcic (2004; see Definitions section). 
Figure 2  Daft and Marcic’s behavior continuum 
Domain of Codified Law Domain of Ethics Domain of Free Choice 
Source: Daft, R. L and Marcic, D. (2004). Understanding management (4th edition). Mason, 
OH: South-Western, p. 113 
 
Figure 3 represents Carroll’s (1991) Pyramid of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. This approach recognizes the broad ranges of business 
responsibilities and also suggests a hierarchy of relation between ethics and 
social responsibility. 
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Figure 3. Carroll’s pyramid of corporation social responsibility 
 
Philanthropic Responsibilities 
Be a good corporate citizen 
Improve the quality of life 
 
 
Ethical Responsibilities 
Be ethical 
Avoid harm 
 
Legal Responsibilities 
Obey the law 
Play by the rules 
 
 
Economic Responsibilities 
Be profitable 
The foundation upon which the others rest 
 
 
Source: Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility; Toward the Moral 
Management of Organizational Stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34(4), p. 42 
 
When evaluating a possible or actual behavior by an organization or 
individual one or all of these three tools may help to determine where the 
action falls on the spectrum of behavior.  Is it criminal, ethical or does it 
really matter? Is the action based on a position of the organization already 
obeying the law and consistently attempting to act ethically? Is this part of a 
strategic process or real advocacy? Not all will agree on the answers, but the 
process of deciding may be helpful. 
CSR PRACTICES IN AVIATION 
The challenge is to find an aviation related business that does not have 
some type of social responsibility program! A search of CSR in the corporate 
information for the 104 member companies of the Aerospace Industries 
Association (AIA) and 21 members of the Air Transportation Association 
(ATA) most often leads to the company’s charitable foundation and or 
activities to support the community. (Community or community outreach are 
synonyms frequently used by companies to describe CSR programs.)  
Companies may place CSR programs or actions into categories. 
American Airlines’ list includes six distinct types in three different groups 
(American Airlines, 2001). Category A is social outreach and recognition. 
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Category B is ethics. Category C includes environmental protection; 
training; health and safety; and diversity.  
The different categories are offered for consideration and comparison 
with Carroll’s pyramid. The majority of policies for the items in category C 
are covered by law and regulation. Examples include the Federal Aviation 
Regulations which prescribe the training requirements and records for pilots 
and flight attendants, the structural demands of cabin seats, and the aircraft’s 
minimum equipment list, among other things.  Many safety and training 
issues are covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act and other 
regulations which require training employees regarding use of fire 
extinguishers; material safety data sheets (MSDS); and other equipment. 
Work conditions (health and safety) are covered by air quality and 
temperature standards. The Equal Pay Act (1963), Title VII of Civil Rights 
Act (1964), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), and other 
legislation, all influence hiring and firing decisions which impacts diversity. 
The Clean Air Act (1990) influences environmental decisions. Actions taken 
by an organization to meet these legal requirements are mandatory and 
including them on a list of socially responsible actions is debatable. 
However, actions which exceed the letter and spirit of the law might be 
viewed as socially responsible actions.  
Carroll’s pyramid (Figure 3) suggests complying with the law (category 
C issues) must occur before an organization is viewed as ethical (category B 
on American’s list).  Many aviation/aerospace organizations have created 
specific ethics policies. Continental Airlines has a Code of Ethics for the 
company Directors (Continental Airlines, 2004). Boeing has a detailed Code 
of Ethics and Business Conduct Program (Boeing, 2005). AirTran includes 
the importance of ethics when discussing corporate governance (AirTran 
Airways, 2005a). The 3M Company lists Ethical Business Conduct 
Guidelines (3M, 2005). These ethics statements match the third level of 
Carroll’s pyramid. Whether or not a company is acting in an ethical manner 
is determined by the court of public opinion. The legal courts determine if it 
is acting criminally.  
Social outreach and recognition is category A on American’s list, top of 
the Carroll pyramid and the key focus of this article. Earlier comments 
described the theory of why a company may behave in a socially responsible 
manner. The discussion of what they do starts now. Examples provided are 
grouped by various views or perspectives. These are the actions taken to 
assist society in ways beyond that required to obtain profit objectives (as 
described in the working definition of CSR). Some of what is described here 
is an ethnographic report of 29 years as an airline manager with both field 
and staff experience at varied airports and corporate headquarters. As 
appropriate, other source material is added. 
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All employees – United Way 
A new employee of an aviation/aerospace company will learn in his or 
her first year that the company provides a platform for donating to the local 
United Way campaign. Delta reports employee donations of $3.4 million to 
United Way in 2003 (Delta Airlines, 2005) and FedEx donations were $12 
million (FedEx, 2004). The United Airlines Foundation, founded in 1952, 
indicates United Way was its only national benefactor for many years 
(United Airlines Foundation, 2005a). An employee is told that he or she not 
only can but is encouraged to give to the local United Way through payroll 
deduction. The company promotes the campaign and provides the collection 
process including computer and other support. Managers are encouraged to 
have a high percentage of their employees participate.  In addition, a 
company may donate a volunteer during the annual city or region campaign 
to aid with the administration of United Way’s program.  
A personal experience indicates the depth of corporate commitment. I 
was asked by a senior officer of my airline to use a professional association 
connection to gain access to the CEO of another local (non-aviation) 
company that did not participate in the United Way campaign. The purpose 
was to encourage participation in the annual campaign. It was another way 
my company was attempting to be supportive. 
 
Employee volunteerism 
The second thing an employee quickly learns is that there are many 
ways to volunteer to support a wide array of causes. The internal company 
communication system might advertise for volunteers to help with the 
upcoming 10K or half-marathon run sponsored by the company to support a 
local charity. Volunteers give up all or part of a day off to direct parking, 
pass out water to runners, or do whatever is needed. Thousands of FedEx 
employees and their families volunteer to support the March of Dimes 
annual fund-raiser walk. In 2004 they raised over $1 million (FedEx, 2005). 
United Airlines says more than 30,000 employees have volunteered for 
community service since 1996 (United, 2005). Have you ever watched the 
Jerry Lewis Telethon over Labor Day Weekend? The ushers in the Las 
Vegas location have been volunteer flight attendants. Many individuals 
answering the phones are volunteer airline employees of all classifications.  
Perhaps through the leadership or sponsorship of a company officer a 
group of employees dedicate themselves to assist a group of young people 
learn about business. Using training and or conference rooms and volunteer 
employee time airlines/aerospace companies sponsor Junior Achievement 
groups (see http://www.ja.org if you are not familiar with the organization) 
and Scout Explorer Posts which offer aviation as one of the areas of 
concentration. Another type of approach involves more than 450 Southwest 
pilots annually offer themselves for adoption by fifth grade classes for a 
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four-week learning program which features the importance of education 
(Southwest.com, 2005).  
In October 2004 Miguel Arocho, an American San Juan based crew 
chief and Gladys Ruiz, a Miami based flight attendant for 16 years, were 
honored for their work on charitable missions in Central America (Someone 
special at American, 2004 October). Each month American describes 
employee volunteerism with a feature story on the AA Information page of 
the seat-back in-flight magazine American Way. Forty-eight United 
employees from around the entire system were brought to the Chicago 
headquarters in April 2004 to be honored by Chairman Glenn Tilton for their 
volunteerism. At the awards ceremony Tilton stated, “We must not only 
provide outstanding customer service, but also demonstrate outstanding 
corporate citizenship” (United NEWSREAL, personal communication, April 
26, 2004). 
It is impossible to list all the ways airline/aerospace employees help 
society through volunteer efforts. The public tends not to learn of, for 
example, flight attendants or others using their passes—with no employer 
involvement—to travel to Asia to pickup an adopted child and fly him or her 
to Los Angeles where the new mom and dad anxiously await. Nor does the 
public learn of the CEO who personally supports bringing busloads of 
middle school children from the inner-city to corporate headquarters, giving 
them a tour, buying their lunch and arranging for a paid junior high school 
summer intern all out of his own pocket. The public does not see the CEO 
carrying the lunch tray and sit next to the sixth-grader who has no real 
comprehension of the position of the person next to her. You can see in her 
wide eyes that she is learning about business and jobs in a way previously 
never imagined. (The CEO forbid the public relations department to promote 
his actions.) This list of laudatory efforts is essentially endless. 
 
Employee/managerial initiatives 
As an employee you may also initiate actions that benefit both society 
and your company. These are issues that go beyond legal requirements. 
Trash is an example! American Airlines permits their in-flight caterers LSG 
Sky Chef and Gate Gourmet to split the proceeds from recycling aluminum 
cans between themselves and the WINGS Foundation, an organization of 
American Flight Attendants that provides assistance to needy peers (Michael 
Saxton, personal communication, June 17, 2005). In the early 1990s United’s 
headquarters initiated a system to recycle all paper products. Some view 
these situations as helping the environment. The kitchen manager is reducing 
his or her trash bill and adding to revenue, WINGS has a gift revenue stream, 
and United reduced the annual headquarters’ garbage bill $200,000 a year. 
Yes, employees should feel good about recycling. Yes, managers should feel 
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good both about recycling and about improving finances. It is a win-win 
situation. 
The pilots and flight managers and company engineers responsible for 
energy conservation working together to taxi on one engine and use ground 
electric power in place of a jet fuel driven auxiliary power units have 
reduced air pollutants, but they have also reduced cost. Again, it is a win-
win. 
 
Company assistance for individual organizations 
Rolls Royce provides facility, equipment, administrative support, and 
financial assistance to Embry-Riddle (Rolls Royce, 2005). Southwest 
Airlines, BF Goodrich and Mitchell Air recently donated $300,000 to Lewis 
University to aid repair of a 737 donated by United in 1999 (Alumni help fix 
Lewis University jumbo jet, 2005, June 10).  Formal internship programs 
between an aviation company and a university are also a form of support for 
university programs. 
CHRIS Kids, Inc., in Atlanta, Georgia, identified AirTran as a strong 
supporter of their program (AirTran Airways, 2005b). Delta uses the 
proceeds from recycling aluminum cans on Hartsfield arrival flights to 
support Habitat for Humanity (Aluminum cans build Habitat for Humanity 
homes, 2005). Northwest publicizes their charitable partners through in-
flight announcements made by flight attendants (Northwest, 2005). The 
DePortola Middle School in San Diego has been adopted by CUBIC 
Corporation, an AIA member primarily involved in military aviation 
(CUBIC Corporation, 2005). The company provides the school consulting 
and technical assistance, computers, tours of CUBIC’s facilities, career days, 
and other support. The Children’s Hunger Alliance in Columbus, Ohio, 
which works to improve the quality of school meals, receives financial 
support from UPS (UPS, 2005). DHL is an active supporter of Operation 
Slugger, an effort to donate sports equipment to US military personnel in 
Iraq (DHL, 2005; Operation Slugger, 2005). 
The general rule for all these examples is that the airline/aerospace 
company’s primary interest is local. Support is provided to organizations 
where the company is based or has major operations.  
 
Requests of the company from the public 
An airline receives countless requests from members of the general 
public for free tickets to be used for fundraisers (e.g., the local church group 
and library board) or to support some other effort such as sending a 
deserving individual to a national conference. The common assumption is 
that the airlines have lots of empty seats and it will not cost them anything to 
provide a ticket. Almost all of these requests are denied. United states they 
do not provide transportation for fundraising events (United Airlines 
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Foundation, 2005b). US Airways lists restrictions, as do many companies, 
and provides a form to use when requesting assistance (Usairways.com, 
2005). 
Another type of request comes from organizations such as the Urban 
League and NAACP that develop a working relationship with the hometown 
airline. A large airline will have a small staff group designed to help promote 
diversity. One of the functions is to judiciously provide transportation and 
other support to appropriate groups. The Atlanta Urban League may call 
Delta and ask for roundtrip tickets for two officers to attend a national 
convention in San Francisco.  Not every request is approved, but the airline 
will truly try to support the group. 
 
Customer’s view through frequent flyer miles 
Customers’ exposure to airline CSR is probably best viewed as an 
opportunity to donate accumulated miles to a particular charity. Northwest 
has a list of AirCares Partners a customer may choose. US Airways and 
Frontier both promote the Make-a-Wish Foundation as their national charity 
for donating miles (usairways.com, 2005). Frontier uses the title Miles-4-
Smiles title for this program (Frontier Airlines, 2004). Hawaiian Airlines 
calls their program Akamai Miles. Akamai is a Hawaiian word meaning 
“smart” or “clever” (Hawaiian Dictionaries, 2005). A unique feature is a 
traveler can adopt a particular local school and donate miles, to which 
Hawaiian Air adds 10%. Or, the traveler can adopt a particular teacher to 
receive the miles which may be used to fly themselves and/or their students 
for educational purposes (Hawaiian Airlines, 2005). 
 
Socially responsible or public relations? 
Sports stadiums tend to have corporate names. The Baltimore Ravens 
play at FedEx Field, the Dallas Mavericks play at the American Airlines 
Center, Michael Jordan played basketball at the United (Airlines) Center. 
This is pure public relations. The airline has written a big check to have the 
facility feature their name. When there is high probability that the stadium 
will be built, a bidding war occurs to determine what name goes on it. Is 
American going to allow a United Center in Dallas? No. Is the repetition of 
the name American Center in Dallas a cost effective means of advertising 
compared to print, TV or billboards? American—and other companies—
must think so. 
In Atlanta you find the Delta Air Lines Assistant Concertmaster Chair 
endowment (Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, 2005). A recent Philadelphia 
Museum of Art exhibit featured works that Boeing helped underwrite 
(Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2005). Northrop Grumman and Southwest 
Airlines are two of the sponsors for the Long Beach, California, Annual Jazz 
Festival (All About Jazz, 2005). United is the official airline of the Chicago 
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Symphony Orchestra and a major sponsor of the annual Ravinia (outdoor 
summer) Music Festival. Is this support of the community and the arts public 
relations or an act of social responsibility? These events are not like the 
stadium that will probably be built anyway. In many, if not most, cases this 
activity does not occur without financial and other support of corporations. 
Johnson’s Social Responsibility Continuum is an appropriate tool to view 
this type of corporate activity. At which level should these actions be placed: 
strategy; advocacy; perhaps a little of each?  
 
Summary of airline/aerospace practices 
This discussion provides only a brief overview of the many socially 
supportive activities conducted by members of these industries. Much of this 
work is accomplished through charitable foundations. America West, 
AMR/American Airlines, Boeing, Delta, and GE, among others, have 
created a corporate foundation to be the focus of any donations of goods and 
services (Foundation Center, 2005). The efforts are applauded by Business 
Ethics: The magazine of corporate responsibility. The list of 100 Best 
Corporate Citizens included AIA/ATA members 3M in 2004 and Southwest 
and FedEx for 2004 and 2005 (100 Best Corporate Citizens, 2005). This 
should not be interpreted as a mark against those excluded from the list but a 
validation of the high standards of CSR subscribed to by members of the 
airline and aerospace family. 
Social responsibility is not something limited to big corporations in the 
aviation industry. Sparked by a student presentation about the management 
of an airport in a small local community (population less than 30,000 
residents) the airport’s fixed base operator (FBO) was asked about 
participation in any CSR or community service activity.  The prompt reply 
was that they contributed to many community organizations and also worked 
closely with the local Easter Seals employment program.  Easter Seals 
supports development and hiring of those with disabilities (Easter Seals, 
2006). One of the 30 full-time employees at the FBO is a part of the Easter 
Seals program (Steve Coulson, personal communication, May 16, 2006).  In 
some ways this response is more impressive than the press release from the 
large corporate public relations department touting the donation of an 
airplane. 
TEACHING PRACTICES 
A web search was used to develop an email list of list of about 190 
faculty in the 56 US aviation management programs (Phillips, 2004). An 
email was sent to these faculty members asking them to take a six question 
mostly multiple-choice survey regarding teaching practices used to support 
CSR. Fifty-eight faculty members from 28 schools responded. Over 90% of 
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those responding believe CSR is highly or of some importance. The intent of 
the survey is to provide a glimpse of teaching practices. No predictive claim 
is made regarding how all aviation faculty do or do not address CSR.  
Responding faculty members indicate they teach a total of 
approximately 135 different courses.  AVM 101 Introduction to Aviation is 
one (fictitious) class, regardless of how many sections are taught. Reports 
indicate that CSR is included in classroom lecture in about 90% of classes 
taught and a specific assignment regarding some aspect of CSR occurs in 
about 50% of classes taught.                                              
Faculty members mentioned five teaching practices regarding CSR: 
1. As one of several possible topics for an independent study class; 
2. As part of the process when developing an aviation corporation;  
3. As a subject for guest lecturers from industry to include in their 
remarks; 
4. As a specific assignment to research and write about; and 
5. As part of an airline simulation.  
 
Two of the eight decisions students must make when participating in Smith 
and Golden’s simulation are social performance budgeting and behavioral 
elements (2006).  The web-based description of Decisions to be Made by 
students includes:   
There are 13 different mini-cases, one for each decision period. 
Teams must respond to each of these. They include social 
responsibility/business ethics issues, environmental forces, and the 
international environment. Each consists of a one page mini-case 
with multiple answers and teams must select the answer they think 
is most appropriate to the situation. If desired, these provide 
excellent class discussion topics.  
 
These survey responses indicate that faculty members: (a) are familiar 
with CSR; (b) believe CSR is important;  and (c) have (at least in some 
cases) trusted, successful techniques for including CSR in the curriculum.  
Comments about classroom techniques show inclusion of the 
Environmental Protection Act and handling of aviation wastes, aviation 
liability, ethics, the harm of poor leadership, the government’s role in 
aviation, critical thinking, aeronautical decision making, diversity and 
evaluating the effectiveness of a flight instructor. An instructor’s classroom 
freedom allows wide diversity in how any subject is defined and approached. 
Using the tools provided by Johnson (2003), Carroll (1991) and Daft and 
Marcic (2004; see Figures 1, 2 and 3) position a subject such as diversity in a 
broad discussion of overall corporate responsibility, not just social 
responsibility. 
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CONCLUSION 
This research leads to guidance for educators, those who teach aviation 
management students in industry and academia. Here are the key findings 
that should be considered for classroom discussion: 
1. A business does not exist in society to only make a buck for the 
owners. It also exists to help make society a better place. 
2. The purpose of the education process is to prepare students to make 
a positive impact in society. 
3. Some companies and many individuals link legal requirements and 
ethics with social responsibility. That is not necessarily wrong, but it may 
cloud the issue of working toward CSR programs. The emphasis on CSR 
should be after and in addition to obeying the law and acting ethically in 
situations where the law is not specific.  
4. Aviation companies and employees voluntarily do many things to 
help others. 
5. In many cases an aviation/aerospace company’s aggressive action 
to meet or exceed the requirement of the law helps both the company and 
society. It is a win-win situation. 
6. What a company does is often not purely profit oriented or socially 
oriented. There is a continuum and much overlap. 
7. The argument about whether or not a company should participate in 
social programs will and should continue. It is important for managers to 
know why they do what they do and argue against what they believe to be 
inappropriate policy. 
8. There is personal benefit received through volunteerism at work.  
One example of the last finding—one not previously discussed—is my 
own family (three girls, mom and dad) that has volunteered at company 
events. One event was helping put on a bicycle ride where riders earned 
pledged dollars for the laps they rode. My 12 year old daughter felt a part of 
the process by counting laps; and the family added to its traditions. Some of 
the most fun career related experiences are jointly working with other 
employees in a volunteer mode. Stories of the fund-raising powder puff 
softball games between flight attendants and local police departments are 
best described in another venue. Win-win is not only profit and environment; 
it is personally doing good and having a lot of fun. 
As a final thought, reflect on the responsibility of the academic or 
industry educator. If our students do not have an appreciation for the history, 
importance and benefits of their organization and themselves acting in a 
socially responsible manner, who is to blame? Do not let the answer be the 
educator for failing to carry the message. 
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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the stock market effects of airline mergers and acquisitions 
that took place in the U.S. during the period 1985-2001 on rival domestic airlines. 
We document significant positive price reactions for the target firms, insignificant 
reactions for the bidders, and marginally significant negative effects for a portfolio 
of rival firms on the day of the merger announcement. Our empirical evidence 
further suggests that the bidder’s market share relative to that of the rival, the 
bidder’s pre-merger market position, and the change in the bidder’s market share 
post-merger are determinants of the magnitude of the rival’s stock price reaction.  
INTRODUCTION 
After deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, a large number of 
mergers and acquisitions have taken place. Airlines have strong motives to 
merge or acquire other airlines in order to increase their market power or 
market coverage, to enhance their operating efficiency, or to overcome 
regulatory entry barriers (Scherer & Ross, 1990). Mergers and acquisitions 
can change the industry’s market structure. Thus, such strategic moves will 
affect all market participants, including the bidder, the target and the existing 
or potential rival firms. These impacts will be directly reflected in the firms’ 
stock prices in an efficient market (Fama, 1970, 1991). 
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While the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the firms directly 
involved have been subject to extensive research, there are relatively few 
studies that examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the market 
value of rivals firms. In the context of the airline industry, this question is of 
interest because mergers and acquisitions not only change the relative market 
positions of the industry players; they also have important policy 
ramifications. For example, if mergers and acquisitions result in excessive 
market power for a particular firm, to the extent of creating an effective 
monopoly, then the purpose of the Airlines Deregulation Act of 1978 (i.e., to 
foster market competition and thus enhance economic efficiency) will be 
defeated. Some prior research focus on examining the economic effects (e.g., 
airfares) of the airline deregulation (Borenstein, 1990; Morrison & Winston, 
1986). Several other studies examine the stock price reactions of rival firms 
in challenged mergers (Eckbo, 1983, 1985; Eckbo & Wier, 1985; Stillman, 
1983). They find that the announcement of mergers increased the market 
price of rival firms’ stocks but they characterize this (weak) increase in 
rivals’ stock price as an information effect; namely, rivals now become more 
likely to be takeover targets as a result of the mergers. Kim and Singal 
(1993) discuss these studies and conclude that tests based on stock market 
prices are at best indirect and probably weak. 
More recently, Park, Park and Zhang (2003) examine the impact of the 
British Airways/USAir Alliance on rival firm value. They find that rival 
firms’ share prices reacted negatively to news that increased the likelihood 
of the Alliance being consummated, and positively to news that decreased 
the likelihood of the Alliance being consummated. This indicates that rival 
firms were thought to suffer from (as in the competitive effect hypothesis), 
rather than benefit from (as in the collusive market hypothesis) the British 
Airways/USAir Alliance. Interestingly, Park et al. report that the effects on 
rival firms are not moderated by the degree of rivalry between the alliance 
partners and their rival firms. This appears to contradict the results in 
Hergott (1997), which indicate that mergers and acquisitions create airline 
dominance at the airport level and lead to market power. More specifically, 
Hergott, using an event study methodology similar to Park et al., finds highly 
significant positive abnormal returns for regional rivals of Northwest-
Republic but not for major airline rivals. Hergott attributes this result to the 
possibility that the regional airlines competed with Northwest-Republic on a 
higher percentage of routes and thus their profits would be more positively 
sensitive to an increase in prices on routes served by Northwest and Republic 
than would those of the major airlines.1 Both the Park et al. and Hergott 
                                                 
1 Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2001) empirically investigate the effect of the 
Continental/America West and Northwest/Alaska alliances and find that both 
alliances caused average fares to fall and that the size of the fare effect was larger on 
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studies were restricted to one single merger case each. Therefore, their 
results are not generalizable and may explain the apparent discrepancy 
between their findings.  
This paper aims to investigate the impact of airline mergers and 
acquisitions on the stock market value of bidders, targets and, in particular, 
their rivals. The study contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
First, the authors conduct a large-scale study that examines the possible 
competitive effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on their rivals. By 
virtue of its long sample period (1985-2001), the study extends the results in 
Echbo (1983, 1985) and others. Second, the authors go further to delineate 
the factors that are associated with the stock price reactions of rivals to the 
announcements of mergers and acquisitions. In doing so, it is hoped that the 
empirical evidence provided can inform the debate on the relative validity of 
the market power hypothesis versus the competitive effect hypothesis. 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON BIDDERS, TARGETS, AND RIVALS 
When two airlines merge or when one airline acquires another airline, a 
new entity is created that is usually more powerful than the combined power 
of the previously separate entities. The merger leads to potential synergies 
and possible market leader power (see Borenstein, 1990; Kim & Singal, 
1993). Synergies may result from greater bargaining power vis-à-vis 
suppliers, or from enhanced operating efficiency, or from greater market 
coverage. A horizontal merger between two airlines may be motivated by the 
desire of one airline to take over a competitor and hence reduce competition, 
or it may occur because one airline wants to enlarge its market coverage by 
controlling another airline that provides a complimentary market network 
(see Hanlon, 1999; O’Connor, 1995). In both cases, the merger is regarded 
as contributing positively to the airlines concerned. For this reason, previous 
studies have found that the targets’ stock prices normally react positively to 
the merger announcement, although the bidders’ reactions are only 
marginally positive or close to zero on average (for a summary of these 
studies, see Panayides & Gong, 2003; Scherer & Ross, 1990). In the airline 
industry, Singal (1996) provides a linkage between the stock market and the 
product market. He found that abnormal returns in the stock market are 
correlated with profit changes in the product market resulting from mergers. 
                                                                                                        
those city pairs where the pre-alliance level of competition was relatively low. Kim 
and Singal (1993) found that routes affected by airline mergers showed significant 
increases in airfare and such increases are positively correlated with changes in 
concentration. Carlton, Landes and Posner (1980) find that airline mergers could 
provide substantial value to consumers. They were, however, unable to empirically 
estimate the possible adverse competitive effects of the North Central-Southern 
merger (the subject of their case study). 
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Zhang and Aldridge (1997) investigate the reaction of investors to news 
about merger and foreign alliance possibilities in the Canadian airline 
industry, and find that favorable news increasing the likelihood of mergers 
and acquisitions are accompanied by significant positive price reactions for 
the bidder and the target.  
Depending on the market setting, rival firms may react either positively 
or negatively to the announcements of mergers and acquisitions. If the 
merger results in a stronger competitor, the rival firms may lose market share 
to the new and stronger competitor. The extent of such losses depends on the 
relative market positions of the firms concerned. In contrast with this 
competitive effect argument, a market power argument suggests that the 
rival firms are likely to benefit from the creation of a stronger competitor if 
the latter exploits its market power to raise prices (Eckbo, 1983; Scherer & 
Ross, 1990). Thus, the value of rival airlines may increase or decrease, 
depending on the relative strength of the competitive effect as opposed to the 
market power effect. The extent of this relative strength may vary from case 
to case, and this may explain the seeming discrepancy between the findings 
of Park et al. (2003) and those of Hergott (1997). The effects of industry or 
firm-specific news on industry rivals (called information transfers) have 
been well documented in the accounting and finance literature (see Firth, 
1976; Foster, 1980; Laux, Starks and Yoon, 1998).  
The authors hypothesize that one key determinant of the net effect of the 
mergers on rival firms is the market share of the newly created competitor 
relative to that of the existing rivals. This is because, if the newly created 
competitor is strong (i.e., has a larger market share) relative to the existing 
rival, then (as under the market power argument) it is more likely to exploit 
its market power and raise prices. If this happens, the rivals may benefit 
from a more collusive market environment and thus their share prices will 
react positively (see Eckbo, 1983). If the newly created competitor is 
relatively weak (i.e., has small market share) as compared with the existing 
rival, it is more likely to compete (through the merger or acquisition) more 
fiercely with the existing rivals and thus all parties will lose from the ensuing 
price wars. This leads to the following mutually exclusive hypotheses. The 
market power hypothesis states that the reaction of an existing rival to a 
merger between two competitor airlines is positively associated with the 
market share of the new competitor created from the merger relative to that 
of the existing rival. The competitive effect hypothesis states that the 
reaction of an existing rival to a merger between two competitor airlines is 
negatively associated with the market share of the new competitor created 
from the merger relative to that of the existing rival.  
Apart from market share, myriad other factors may determine the price 
reaction of the rivals. For example, firm size, and the extent of network 
overlaps or similarity of routes and services provided may also help to 
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explain the impact of a merger or acquisition on the market value of a rival 
firm (see Hergott, 1997; Eckel, Eckel & Singal, 1997).2 Omitting these 
factors should not introduce any systematic bias and they are better left to a 
future study. 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND TESTING METHODOLOGY 
Our study investigates the price reactions of rival airlines to the first 
public announcement of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. airline 
industry. The period examined is from 1985 to 2001. Mergers are defined as 
two firms merging into one single entity and acquisitions are defined as a 
company acquiring a relatively important percentage (an arbitrary 14%) of 
ownership in the target firms. For convenience, the word merger is used to 
refer to both cases. 
 
Selection of bidders and targets 
The instances of mergers are identified by searching the Factiva 
database for ‘mergers’ and ‘airlines’ in the period 1985 to 2001. This 
database covers a number of journals, magazines and newspapers including 
the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones News Service, Reuters and PR 
Newswire. The announcement date is the date on which the merger or 
acquisition activity was first publicly released in the media. To be selected, 
the sample bidder and target firms must meet the following criteria. 
1. The bidder and the target firms must conduct business in the United 
States. 
2. The firms’ main income is derived from passenger transportation. 
3. The firms must be public-listed and daily stock returns must be 
available from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in 
Security Prices Daily Returns File in the 255 trading days before 
and 5 days after the announcement date. This enables the estimation 
of the market model parameters and for the computation of firms’ 
abnormal returns around the mergers.  
4. Firms must not have major corporate events occurring during the 
event window (5 days centered on the announcement date). This 
criterion is to rule out cases where confounding events occurred 
during the merger announcement period.  
The final sample consists of 15 mergers. These are listed in Table 1. 
                                                 
2 To a large extent, these alternative factors are likely to be highly correlated with 
market share (properly defined). 
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Table 1: Mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. airline industry 1985-2001 
Case 
Announcement 
Date Bidder 
Target 
(% acquisition 
in brackets) Key Rival Airlines 
1 2-Oct-85 Piedmont Airlines Empire Airlines Eastern Airlines, US Air 
2 23-Jan-86 Northwest Airlines Republic Airlines United Airlines, American Airlines 
3 24-Feb-86 Continental Airlines Eastern Airlines American Airlines, US Air 
4 27-Feb-86 Trans World Airlines Ozark Airlines Southwest Airlines, Continental Airlines 
5 23-May-86 Delta Airlines Atlantic Southeast (20%) Eastern Airlines, Republic Airlines 
6 29-May-86 Delta Airlines ComAir (20%) Air Wisconsin, American Airlines 
7 9-Sep-86 Delta Airlines Western Airlines Pan American World Airways, United Airlines 
8 9-Mar-87 US Air Piedmont Aviation American Airlines, United Airlines 
9 23-Jul-87 Alaska Airlines Jet American Airlines United Airlines, Delta Airlines 
10 10-Dec-90 Northwest Airlines 
Hawaiian Airlines 
(25%) United Airlines, Continental Airlines 
11 17-Sep-91 United Airlines Air Wisconsin American Airlines, Midway Airlines 
12 16-Dec-97 Northwest Airlines Continental Airlines (14%) American Airlines, United Airlines 
13 19-Nov-98 American Airlines Reno Air Alaska Airlines, Southwest Airlines 
14 24-May-00 United Airlines US Airways American Airlines, Continental Airlines 
15 8-Jan-01 American Airlines Trans World Airlines 
Northwest Airlines, Continental 
Airlines 
Source: Factiva 
Selection of rivals 
Before the Airlines Deregulation of 1978, airlines provided point-to-
point or city-pair services, so they were mainly competing on the point-to-
point service. After the deregulation, however, there was a significant change 
in the routing and schedule patterns of airlines because of new entrants. 
Airlines increasingly structured their services via the hub-and-spoke network 
system. A hub is a central airport where passengers are collected from feeder 
flights, transferred to other flights on the same airline, and then carried to 
their ultimate destination. A spoke provides feeder services which transport 
passengers between different small points and the hub. Because hub-and-
spoke network has the benefits of better connectivity for passengers, higher 
load factors and lower unit costs, more and more airlines tend to operate the 
hub-and-spoke system (Brueckner & Spiller, 1991). Usually, major airlines 
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have multiple hubs because this enables them to serve small and widely 
spread markets. If two airlines operate a hub-and-spoke service in a similar 
geographical area, they are competing for the same customers. One of the 
reasons airlines engage in mergers is to reduce competition in the same hub 
or service areas, to increase their market power relative to competitors, or to 
expand their network and enhance the service level.  
Therefore, rivals for each merger case are selected on two criteria: a) 
They conduct air passenger business in the same geographic market as the 
target and/or the bidder; or b) Their hubs are close to each other, so that their 
spokes may overlap. Based on these two criteria, rivals are identified from 
the Factiva news reports accompanying the merger announcements. Two 
key rivals for each merger event so identified are listed in the last column of 
Table 1.3 
Market share of bidder, target, and rivals 
The market power of a firm has been shown to be positively related to 
market share; larger firms generally wield greater market power. In the 
airline industry, an airline’s market share is taken to be its output (measured 
in terms of revenue passenger kilometers or RPK) as a proportion of the total 
industry output in a particular geographical area or market. A competitive 
hub-and-spoke network is one that brings a large number of passengers on 
flights to airlines, and RPK is a good measurement of the average number of 
passengers on flights. Ideally, the market share of the airlines involved 
(bidder, target, and rival) should be measured in a narrowly defined market, 
for example, in the regional area for regional airlines or on the national level 
for majors. Since such narrowly defined market share data are not available 
to us, we measure an airline’s market share as the ratio of its number of 
domestic RPK to the total industry RPK excluding international traffic (see 
Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson, 1991). The market share of each airline in the 
year prior to the merger announcement is computed from annual traffic 
statistics published by International Civil Aviation Organization and/or taken 
directly from the Factiva reports.4.  
 
Measuring abnormal price reaction around the merger announcements  
To the extent that a merger is likely to change the future profitability of 
the companies involved (these include not only bidders and targets, but also 
                                                 
3 There is no theoretical reason why only two rivals are selected. In practice, 
however, most regional airline markets operate as a tight oligopoly with from 
two to four competing firms (see McCarthy, 2001).  
4 These news reports from which we identified the dates of the mergers, the 
firms involved, and the market share statistics are available from the authors 
on request. 
 Gong and Firth 95 
 
 
rivals), the effects of the event will be rapidly reflected in the stock prices of 
the firms in an efficient capital market. Fama (1970, 1991) and Elton and 
Gruber (2003) provide extensive evidence in support of this. In line with 
existing studies, we adopt an event study methodology to measure firms’ 
abnormal returns surrounding merger announcements. Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985) provide details on the event study methodology. 
Define the date of the announcement of a merger as event day 0. In the 
absence of the merger, the expected return to the jth stock at time t, jtR  is 
represented by the market model: 
 jtmtjjjt RR ∈++= βα                                 (1.) 
Where mtR  is the market return at time t and ∈ is a zero-mean disturbance 
term. jβ  is the sensitivity of the jth stock to the market and jα  measures 
the mean return to the stock when the market return is zero. Therefore, 
mtj Rβ  is the part of the returns explained by the normal relationship of the 
stock with the market index.  
The market model parameters jα  and jβ are estimated via ordinary 
least squares regression using daily returns during the estimate window         
(-255,-6) relative to the event date. The abnormal returns of the jth stock at 
the time t is measured as the prediction error of the market model: 
 mtjjjtjt RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=                         (2.) 
The sample average abnormal return at time t ( tAR ) is computed as 
                                 ∑
=
=
N
j
jtt ARN
AR
1
1
                                     (3.) 
where N is the total number of firms in each group, i.e. the bidder, target, 
and rivals. The cumulative average abnormal return from event time p up to 
event time q, ),( qpCAR  is given by: 
                        ∑
=
=
q
pt
tARqpCAR ),(                                      (4.) 
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If the merger announcement does not affect the share prices at time t, the 
average abnormal returns of the related firms, tAR , should be statistically 
close to zero. The test statistics for tAR and ),( qpCAR  are: 
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Where )(ˆ ARS  is the standard deviation of the average abnormal returns 
estimated during the estimate window (-255, -6). 
Theory as well as previous studies suggests that the reactions of bidders, 
targets and rivals are usually different. The price reaction of bidders is 
usually small, from slightly positive, to close-to-zero. This result is attributed 
to the fact that investors believe the acquiring firms often pay a full price for 
the target or, in some cases, overpay. Managerial or incentive problems may 
also cause short term price reactions, or even long term underperformance 
for the bidders (see Firth, 1991). In contrast, the target firms usually have 
high positive abnormal returns. This is because, apart from the premium paid 
to shareholders of the target firm, investors are generally also optimistic 
about the target’s future performance after the merger. On this basis, the 
authors predict significant abnormal returns to the targets.  
As discussed in Effects of Mergers section above, the reaction of the 
rivals depends on the market setting. If the market power effect dominates 
the competitive effect, then a horizontal merger may induce positive 
abnormal returns to the rivals. Negative abnormal returns to the rivals are 
consistent with a net competitive effect. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Abnormal returns of bidders, targets, and rivals around the merger 
acquisition date 
The mean returns and systematic risks (beta) of bidders, targets, and 
rivals computed during the estimation window are presented in Table 2. Of 
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special interest is the mean beta for bidders, targets, and rivals, which are 
1.19, 1.75 and 1.60, respectively. These are all numerically and statistically 
greater than unity, in contrast with earlier studies that documented a below-
unity average beta for U.S. airlines (see Gong, Firth and Cullinane, 2006; 
Turner & Morrell, 2002).5  
Table 2: Mean returns and systematic risks of bidders, targets, and rivals 
 
The average abnormal returns to bidders, targets and rivals are listed in 
Table 3 and depicted in Figure 1. On the event day 0, the average abnormal 
return to bidders is slightly negative at -0.24% but is statistically 
insignificant. The cumulative abnormal return during day -1 and day 0 is 
marginally significant at 1.50% (Table 4). This indicates that the market 
expects the mergers to increase the bidders’ future profitability, at least 
slightly. 
                                                 
5 Using a small sample of U.S. airlines, Flouris and Walker (2005) find that the 
systematic risks or beta coefficients of U.S. airlines increased considerably after 9/11. 
The average beta was below unity before 9/11 but was substantially greater than 
unity post-9/11. Estimation of beta for airlines warrants a separate study in its own 
right.    
Group Number of 
obs. 
Mean Return 
(standard deviation) 
Beta 
(standard deviation) 
Bidders 15 0.00092 (0.00099) 1.19 (0.647) 
Targets 15 0.00115 (0.00185) 1.75 (0.445) 
Rivals 30 0.00080 (0.00134) 1.60 (0.605) 
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Figure 1: Average abnormal returns of bidders, targets, and rivals around the 
merger announcement date 
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Table 4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAR) of bidders, targets, and rivals 
 Bidders Targets Rivals 
Event Day CAR (%) Z-stat CAR (%) Z-stat CAR (%) Z-stat 
-5 to -2 1.59 1.49$ 5.10 2.90** 0.01 0.31 
-1 to 0 1.50 1.59$ 11.18 8.20*** 0.59 1.08 
1 to 5 1.35 0.94 -1.72 -0.81 -0.64 -0.62 
 
Target firms on average experienced a high and positive abnormal return 
of 10.5% on the first announcement of the mergers. The existence of positive 
abnormal returns beginning from three days before the actual announcement 
 Bidders Targets Rivals 
Event Day CAR (%) Z-stat CAR (%) Z-stat CAR (%) Z-stat 
-5 0.42 0.60 0.31 0.42 -1.32 -1.60$ 
-4 -0.09 0.00 0.20 0.88 -0.57 -0.93 
-3 0.97 1.96* 3.29 3.03** 0.40 0.95 
-2 0.30 0.42 1.30 1.47$ 1.51 2.20* 
-1 1.75 2.84** 0.69 1.70* 1.45 2.83** 
0 -0.24 -0.59 10.50 9.90*** -0.85 -1.30$ 
1 0.96 1.42$ 0.68 0.77 -0.45 -0.32 
2 0.69 1.09 -0.17 -0.22 -0.21 -0.70 
3 0.18 0.38 -0.32 -0.41 1.18 1.66* 
4 -0.35 -0.45 -0.92 -1.07 -1.40 -2.09* 
5 -0.12 -0.35 -0.99 -0.89 0.23 0.06 
Table 3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of bidders, targets, and rivals 
$, *, **, *** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level, respectively. 
$, *, **, *** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level, respectively.
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may reflect information leakage or market anticipation for the forthcoming 
merger. The magnitude of these abnormal returns are however much lower 
than that on the event day, indicating that the announcement itself conveys 
positive incremental information about the merger and its effects on the 
market value of the targets. Together with a cumulative abnormal return of 
11.18% during the two days leading up to the announcement, the evidence is 
consistent with findings in previous studies that target firms are the greatest 
beneficiaries of a merger, partly because they are generally smaller than the 
bidders and partly because of the premium paid. It is noteworthy that both 
the bidders and the targets react rapidly and fully to the merger 
announcement, as abnormal price reactions do not last beyond the first 
announcement (Figure 2). This is consistent with the semi-strong form of the 
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). 
Figure 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAR) of bidders, targets, and rivals 
around the merger announcement date 
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The focus of this study is the stock price effects of the merger 
announcement on the rival firms of the bidder and/or the target. For each 
merger case, two major rivals for the bidder and/or the target have been 
identified. The average effect of the merger announcement on the rivals is 
captured in the equally weighted returns to the portfolio of the two rivals’ 
shares. Table 3 reveals that although the rival firms on average experienced 
significant abnormal returns during the few days centered on the 
announcement (i.e., day -2 to day 4), the sign of these abnormal returns does 
not reveal a clear pattern about the direction of the reaction for the rivals. On 
day -2 and day -1, the average abnormal returns were 1.51% and 1.45, 
respectively, and significant at the 5% level. However, the average abnormal 
return on the announcement day is -0.85%, and significant at the 10% level. 
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The cumulative average abnormal return to the rivals during day -1 to day 0 
is 0.59%, which is insignificant at conventional levels (Table 4). The 
evidence also seems to suggest some type of semi-strong form inefficiency 
in that significant abnormal returns still exist in the post-event period. Post-
announcement drifts of this sort are well documented in the accounting 
literature. 
It should be emphasized that the above evidence reflects the average 
reaction of the rival firms. In reality, any two rivals corresponding with a 
merger case may experience reactions in different directions. For example, a 
closer rival may react positively to the creation of a much stronger or larger 
competitor, if the competitor is expected to result in a more collusive 
industry structure leading to higher output prices in the same geographical 
market. In comparison, a more distant rival may not benefit by as much, or 
may even lose from this new and stronger entrant, if the latter competes 
away customers from the more distant rival without raising its output prices. 
In the Effects of Mergers section above, the authors argue that the market 
share of the newly created entrant, either in absolute value or relative to the 
rival firm, may be used to test the empirical validity of the market power 
hypothesis and the competitive effect hypothesis. Next results of regressing 
the rival’s abnormal returns against the target’s market share are presented 
(alternatively, the combined market share of the bidder and the target). 
Scaling the rival’s abnormal return by the bidder’s abnormal return allows 
parsimonious models to be tested (Firth, 1996). This standardized measure 
also adjusts for the impact of the merger announcement on the bidder itself: 
The more the merger is expected to improve the bidder’s market position (as 
reflected in positive abnormal returns), the greater is the potential of the 
merger to affect the rivals (either from the market power or from the 
competitive effect perspective). Using only the rival’s abnormal returns as 
the dependent variable weakens the statistical results (not reported) but does 
not change the conclusions qualitatively. 
 
Relation between market share and rival’s price action 
We first present the results when market share is measured as the market 
share for the bidder relative to that of the rival (Panel A, Table 5). The mean 
relative information transfer, RIT, which is measured as the ratio of the 
rivals’ cumulative abnormal returns during day -1 and day 0 to the bidder’s 
cumulative abnormal return in the same interval, is -0.40.6 This means that, 
on average, the reactions of bidders and rivals are opposite in sign: if the 
bidder’s stock price reacted positively to the merger announcement, its rival 
reacted negatively, and vice versa. This is consistent with the competitive 
                                                 
6 The results remain qualitatively the same when using alternative windows 
(-1, 1) and (-5, 5) and are thus not reported.  
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effect hypothesis: when one benefits from a merger, the other one suffers 
from it. 
 
Table 5: Cross-Sectional Regression Results* 
 
  
Five observations in Panel A do not have market share data, leaving 25 observations. 
Eight other observations in Panel B and Panel C do not have market share data, leaving 17                
observations. 
 
The coefficient of relative market share is -0.65, which is significant at 
the 0.1% level. This indicates that the competitive effect of airline mergers 
on the rival firms is negatively related to the market share of the bidder 
relative to that of the rival. Intuitively, if the bidder is large relative to the 
rival (i.e., has a larger market share), the stock price reaction of the rival is 
more negative and thus opposite in sign to the bidder’s stock price reaction. 
This indicates that when a large bidder acquires a target firm in the same 
geographical area as the rival, the rival tends to react in the opposite 
direction as the bidder firm itself: if the bidder experiences a positive price 
reaction, the rival experiences highly negative abnormal returns, which 
reflects the market’s expectation that the rival will lose from the entry (via a 
merger) of a strong competitor. This is consistent with the competitive effect 
hypothesis, and is in line with the negative mean value of RIT. The R-
squared is 0.45, which indicates that 45% of the total variance in RIT is 
explained by the regression model. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results when relative market share is 
measured as the combined market share of the bidder and the target relative 
to the market share of the rival. The market share coefficient is -0.68, 
Panel A. Relative market share (RMS) measured as the bidder’s market share relative 
to that of the rival 
No. of obs.                Intercept (t-statistic)      RMS coefficient (t-statistic) 
25                              0.48 (0.15)                     -0.65 (-4.22) 
Mean value of dependent variable = -0.40    
R-squared = 0.45 
 
Panel B. Relative market share (RMS) measured as the combined market share of the 
bidder’s and the rival’s market shares relative to that of the rival 
No. of obs.              Intercept (t-statistic)       RMS coefficient (t-statistic) 
17                           -0.72 (-0.15)                    -0.68 (-3.38) 
Mean value of dependent variable = -0.64   
R-squared = 0.42 
 
Panel C. Multiple regression results (t-statistic in brackets) 
No. of obs.   RMS                 Bidder’s Market Share      Change in Bidder’s Market Share 
17               -0.46 (-2.91)         -0.19 (-1.76)                     -0.14 (-1.29) 
Mean value of dependent variable = -0.64   
Adjusted R-squared = 0.55 
*Dependent variable )0,1()0,1( _/_ −−= CARBidderCARRivalRIT .  
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significant at the 0.1% level. The R-squared is 0.42 (p-value < 0.001), 
indicating that the model has strong explanatory power. Thus, the result in 
Panel B confirms and reinforces the result in Panel A and is supportive of the 
competitive effect hypothesis rather than the market power hypothesis. 
Panel C of Table 5 differs from Panel B in that the bidder’s pre-merger 
market share (average being 10.24%) and the percentage change in the 
bidder’s market share after the merger (average being 4.2%) are added as 
additional explanatory variables.7 Since a stronger bidder (as reflected in a 
large market share before the merger and a significant increase in its market 
share as a result of the merger) may be considered a market leader and/or 
induce stronger inter-firm competition,8 both of these two additional 
explanatory variables are expected to be negatively associated with the 
abnormal returns of the rival under the competitive effect hypothesis. The 
coefficient of bidder’s market share is -0.19, which marginally significant. 
The coefficient of the change in bidder’s market share has the expected sign 
but is not significant at conventional levels. Note that the coefficient of 
relative market share has dropped to -0.46 but remains highly statistically 
significant. The adjusted R-squared is relatively high at 0.55, indicating 
reasonable goodness of fit. 
Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that competitive effects of airline 
mergers dominate market power effects, and the bidder’s market position 
and the change in its market share are determinants of the rival’s stock price 
reaction. This makes intuitive sense because, if the creation of a strong 
competitor (through merger or acquisition) benefits rather than harms the 
existing rivals, the rivals to oppose to these strategic activities by their 
competitors will not be observed (Park et. al., 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
The authors investigate the competitive effects of airline mergers and 
acquisitions on the market value of rival airlines. Using 15 cases of mergers 
and acquisitions that took place in the U.S. airline industry during 1985 to 
2001, it was found that bidders and targets react in a way consistent with 
findings in previous studies. Bidders in general experienced marginally 
positive abnormal returns, whereas targets experienced highly positive 
abnormal returns around the first public announcement of the mergers. 
Evidence on the average reaction of rival firms was mixed, with positive 
                                                 
7 Regression diagnostics reveal no significant multicollinearity between these 
explanatory variables. 
8 Theoretically and as previously discussed, a collusive market structure may also 
result from the creation of a strong competitor. Such collusion will benefit the market 
participants and induce positive stock price reactions in the rivals. This empirical 
issue has to be determined empirically. 
 Gong and Firth 103 
 
 
price reaction immediately prior to the announcement, negative reaction on 
the date of the announcement, and a mixture of negative and positive 
reactions in the post-merger period. Further cross-sectional regression 
analysis reveals that competitive effect is moderated by the bidder’s market 
share relative to the rival’s market share. The bidder’s market position and 
its change in market share (pre-merger versus post-merger) also affect the 
stock price reaction of the rival firms. Thus, the larger or stronger the bidder 
is, the stronger (i.e., more negative) is the competitive effect associated with 
the mergers. Overall, the evidence in this study may be interpreted as 
supporting the competitive effect hypothesis rather than the market power 
hypothesis. Such evidence may be cited to justify industry opposition to 
strategic activities such as mergers that may hurt competitors, and to 
alleviate regulatory concern that mergers may lead to a more collusive 
industry structure. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article puts forward the argument that the measurement of connectivity in hub-
and-spoke networks has to take into account the quality and quantity of both direct 
and indirect connections. The NETSCAN model, which has been applied in this 
study, quantifies indirect connectivity and scales it into a theoretical direct 
connection. NETSCAN allows researchers, airports, airlines, alliances and airport 
regions to analyse their competitive position in an integrated way. Using 
NETSCAN, the authors analysed the developments on the market between 
northwest Europe and the United States (US) between May 2003 and May 2005. 
One of the most striking developments has certainly been the impact of the Air 
France-KLM merger and the effects of the integration of KLM and Northwest into 
the SkyTeam alliance on the connectivity of Amsterdam Schiphol. Direct as well as 
indirect connectivity (via European and North American hubs) from Amsterdam to 
the US increased substantially. The main reason for this increase is the integration 
of the former Wings and SkyTeam networks via the respective hub airports. 
Moreover, the extended SkyTeam alliance raised frequencies between Amsterdam 
and the SkyTeam hubs (Atlanta, Houston, for example), opened new routes 
(Cincinnati) and boosted the network between Amsterdam and France. As a result 
of the new routes and frequencies, Amsterdam took over Heathrow’s position as the 
third best-connected northwest European airport to the US.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Hub-and-spoke networks have been an essential feature of the 
operations of air carriers since the deregulation of the domestic American air 
transport market in 1978. Hub-and-spoke networks allow the hub airline to 
maximize the number of connected city pairs given a certain number of 
flights. Due to the consolidation of different origin-destination combinations 
on a limited number of routes, the hub airline may benefit from higher load 
factors, higher frequencies and the use of larger aircraft with lower unit costs 
(Dennis, 1994a, 1994b). 
In a hub-and-spoke network, the carrier concentrates its network both 
spatially and temporally (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). From a spatial point of 
view, the carrier organizes its network around one or a few central hub 
airports. At the hub, passengers transfer to their connecting flight. From a 
temporal perspective, the flight schedule at the hub is organised in a number 
of daily waves of incoming and outgoing flights, in which ideally all 
incoming flights connect to all outgoing flights (Bootsma, 1997). The wave 
system restricts the loss of passenger demand due to the additional transfer 
time of an indirect connection compared to a direct connection. 
Also in Europe, the hub-and-spoke network has gained ground since the 
liberalisation of the internal European Union (EU) market (1988-1997). 
Already before the liberalisation of the EU market, the national airlines 
operated star-shaped networks, spatially concentrated around the national 
home bases. Yet, most of these carriers could not be characterised as hub-
and-spoke airlines. The star-shaped networks were merely the result of the 
system of bilateral air service agreements that pinned down the designated 
carriers on their national home bases. Since the liberalisation of the market, 
many national and a few regional airlines built up their hub-and-spoke 
network by means of the intensification and adoption of wave systems 
(Burghouwt, 2005). However, since 2001 a shakeout on the hub market has 
taken place. Some hubs were torn down or rationalized by their home based 
carriers. British Airways dehubbed London Gatwick because the split-hub 
operation at Heathrow and Gatwick was not profitable. Iberia cancelled its 
hub operations at Miami because security measures at the airport had been 
tightened due to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and connecting 
times had doubled. Air France rationalized the hub operation at Clermont-
Ferrand after the take-over of Regional Airlines in 2000. The hub operation 
at Clermont-Ferrand (the former hub of Regional Airlines) duplicated 
substantially the hub operation of Air France at Lyon. Other hubs 
disappeared or were scaled down because of the bankruptcies of the hub 
carriers (Sabena at Brussels, Swissair and Zurich, Air Littoral at Nice, 
Crossair at Basle). 
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Global airline alliances are increasingly important for the future of hubs. 
The three global airline alliances (OneWorld, Star and SkyTeam) choose one 
or two hubs at each continent to function as primary intercontinental 
gateways. Other hubs fulfil secondary, regionally oriented roles (Dennis, 
2005). 
The growth of hub-and-spoke operations has changed the competition 
between airlines in a structural way. The competitive position of airlines and 
airports is usually expressed in terms of top ten lists. Airlines and airports are 
compared with respect to total passenger enplanements, number of aircraft 
movements or tonnes of freight. Although such indicators are valuable in 
itself, they do not give any information on the competitive position of airline 
networks and hub airports.  
The gap in such analyses is the fact that, because of the rise of hub-and-
spoke systems, competition between airlines takes place in both a direct and 
indirect way. On the one hand, airlines compete on direct routes (from A to 
B). On the other had, they compete indirectly with a transfer at a hub (from 
A to B via H). The passenger’s choice for a certain route alternative will 
depend, among other things, on the ticket price and network quality. 
Especially in case of the availability of a direct route alternative, ticket price 
will be an important tool for an airline offering an indirect connection to 
compensate for lower network quality. Network quality is defined here as the 
frequency and associated travel times of a certain connection. 
This paper discusses the competitive position between airports, airlines, 
alliances and their hubs on the market between northwest Europe and the 
US. The analysis is restricted to network quality. Reliable price data are 
scarce and, if available, hard to use because of the large number of quickly 
changing ticket prices on a single flight. 
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section places this study in 
the context of earlier research on hub-and-spoke networks. The third 
section discusses the principles of hub-and-spoke systems in relation to 
network quality and connectivity. The fourth section deals with the 
NETSCAN model. The fifth and sixth sections discuss the empirical results 
of the research. The final section presents the conclusions of the research.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The rise of hub-and-spoke networks has been the subject of many 
academic studies. One branch of research deals with the advantages of hub-
and-spoke networks in terms of economies of density and scope (Braeutigam 
1999; Brueckner & Spiller, 1994; Caves, Christensen & Tretheway, 1984; 
Wojahn 2001), hub premiums, (Berry, Carnall & Spiller, 1996; Borenstein 
1989; Leijsen, Rietveld & Nijkamp, 2000; Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 1995), 
entry deterrence (Zhang 1996) and the role of hub-and-spoke networks in 
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airline alliances (Dresner & Windle, 1995; Oum, Park & Zhang, 2000; Pels, 
2001). A second branch of research aims to optimize hub-and-spoke 
networks spatially by means of hub location-allocation models (Kuby & 
Gray 1993; O’Kelly & Miller, 1994; O’Kelly, 1998; O’Kelly & Bryan, 
1998). 
Another branch of research has studied the structure, performance and 
growth of hub-and-spoke networks from an empirical point of view. Most 
studies focus on the spatial dimension of hub-and-spoke networks: the level 
to which an airline has concentrated its network on a few key nodes in the 
network (Bania, Bauer & Zlatoper, 1998; Burghouwt, Hakfoort & Ritsema-
Van Eck, 2003; Ivy, 1993; Shaw, 1993; Reynolds-Feighan, 2001; Wojahn, 
2001). However, Bootsma (1997), Burghouwt (2005), Burghouwt and de 
Wit (2005); Dennis (1994a, 1994b), Reynolds-Feighan (2001) and Wojahn 
(2001) explicitly underline the temporal dimension or schedule structure as 
an essential element for the empirical study of the structure, performance and 
development of hub-and-spoke networks. Hub-and-spoke airlines offer 
consumers both direct and indirect travel opportunities (via their hub). To 
maximize indirect travel opportunities and to minimize passenger loss due to 
transfer time and detour time indirect travel opportunities need efficient 
schedule coordination in terms of a well developed wave system structure at 
the hub. 
However, schedule coordination and the resulting hub performance are 
not captured by the traditional graph theoretical or spatial concentration 
measures. Only a few authors have included the level of schedule 
coordination in the measurement of the performance and structure of hub-
and-spoke networks (for example, Bootsma, 1997; Burghouwt, 2005; 
Dennis, 1994b; Veldhuis, 1997). These studies include the possibility of 
making transfers from one flight to another, taking into account minimum 
and maximum connecting times and the quality of those connections. In 
this study, the NETSCAN model, developed by Veldhuis (1997) and 
owned by SEO Economic Research, has been applied to measure the 
performance of airline networks in the transatlantic market.  
NETWORK QUALITY, HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEMS AND 
CONNECTIVITY 
The extent to which airlines can play a role in the market between A and 
B depends on a number of factors. First, the size of the market is important. 
If the size of the origin-destination market is larger than a certain critical 
threshold, an airline may decide to serve that market directly. The critical 
threshold will also depend on the critical load factor, the size of the smallest 
airplane that can be operated on the route and the minimum desired weekly 
frequency. If the market size is below this threshold, the market can only be 
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served indirectly. However, this does not mean that, if a direct travel 
opportunity is available all passengers will choose the direct travel 
alternative. In reality, traffic will be spread over direct and indirect travel 
opportunities, depending on ticket prices and the network quality of the 
indirect connection.  
The quality of an indirect connection between A and B with a transfer at 
hub H is not equal to the quality of a direct connection between A and B. In 
other words, the passenger travelling indirectly will experience additional 
costs due to longer travel times, consisting of detour time and transfer time. 
The transfer time equals at least the minimum connecting time, or the 
minimum time needed to transfer between two flights at hub H.  
Hence, the extent to which an airline is able to serve successfully an 
indirect market is, besides prices, mainly dependent on two things. First, the 
geographical location of the respective hub in relation to the main 
continental and intercontinental traffic flows. Second, the efficiency of the 
airline’s schedule is crucial. If a carrier is able to coordinate its incoming and 
outgoing flights effectively so that all incoming flights connect to all 
outgoing flights, the quality loss of an indirect connection can be kept to a 
minimum. 
Against the background of hub-and-spoke networks, this article 
distinguishes three types of connections: 
1. Direct connections: flights between A and B without a hub transfer 
(e.g., from Amsterdam to Los Angeles) 
2. Indirect connections: flights from A to B, but with a transfer at hub X 
(e.g., from Amsterdam to Los Angeles via Detroit) 
 
Hub connections: connections via (with a transfer at) hub A between 
origin C and destination B (e.g., from Hamburg via Amsterdam to Los 
Angeles). 
In fact, hub connections are equal to indirect connections. However, 
indirect connectivity is measured from the perspective of the originating 
airport and hub connectivity is measured from the perspective of the hub 
airport. The measurement of indirect connectivity is particularly important 
from the perspective of consumer welfare (e.g., how many direct and indirect 
connections are available to consumers between Amsterdam and Los 
Angeles). The concept of hub connectivity is particularly important for 
measuring the competitive position of airline hubs in a certain market (e.g., 
how does Amsterdam perform as a hub in the market between Hamburg and 
Los Angeles). 
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METHOD AND DATA 
The NETSCAN model 
As the authors argued earlier, the quality of an indirect connection is not 
equal to the quality of a direct connection. The NETSCAN model quantifies 
the quality of an indirect connection and scales it to the quality of a 
theoretical direct connection. The authors discuss briefly the methodology of 
the NETSCAN model in general terms. For a detailed discussion, refer to 
Veldhuis (1997) and IATA (2000). 
NETSCAN assigns a quality index to every connection, ranging 
between 0 and 1. A direct, non-stop flight is given the maximum quality 
index of 1. The quality index of an indirect connection will always be lower 
than 1 since extra travel time is added due to transfer time and detour time of 
the flight. The same holds true for a direct multi-stop connection: passenger 
face a lower network quality because of en-route stops compared to a non-
stop direct connection. 
If the additional travel time of an indirect connection exceeds a certain 
threshold, the quality index of the connection equals 0. The threshold of a 
certain indirect connection between two airports depends on the travel time 
of a theoretical direct connection between these two airports. In other words, 
the longer the theoretical direct travel time between two airports, the longer 
the maximum indirect travel time can be. For example, a maximum indirect 
travel time of three hours belongs to a direct flight of one hour, while the 
maximum indirect travel time of a 12-hour flight equals 24 hours. The travel 
time of a theoretical direct connection is determined by the geographical 
coordinates of origin and destination airport and assumptions on flight speed 
and time needed for take-off and landing. By taking the product of the 
quality index and the frequency of the connection per time unit (day, week, 
and year), the total number of connections or connectivity units (CNUs), can 
be derived.  Summarizing the following model has been applied for each 
individual (direct, indirect or hub) connection:  
MAXT = (3 - 0.075 * NST) * NST  (1) 
PTT =  FLY + (3 * TRF)   (2) 
QUAL = 1 – ((PTT - NST)/(MAXT - NST)) (3) 
CNU = QUAL * FREQ   (4) 
Where MAXT is the maximum perceived travel time, NST is the non-stop 
travel time, PTT is the perceived travel time, FLY is the flying time, TRF 
is the transfer time, QUAL is the quality index of an individual 
connection and CNU is the number of connectivity units. 
Table 1 illustrates the NETSCAN model. Consider the example of the 
connectivity between Amsterdam and Cincinnati. The SkyTeam alliance 
operates a daily direct connection to Cincinnati in May 2005. The direct 
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flight has a quality index of 1 since no transfer time or detour time is 
involved. Hence, the number of CNUs per week equals the frequency per 
week. Besides a direct connection, SkyTeam, and to a lesser extent the Star 
alliance, offers indirect connections via other American and European hubs. 
In this respect, Detroit is the most important hub. In theory, the number of 
viable connections (quality index > 0) via Detroit is 89 per week. However, 
as a result of transfer time and detour time, the average quality index equals 
0,32. This results in a total number of weighted CNUs of 28,7. Because 
NETSCAN scales the indirect connection to a theoretical direct connection, 
the CNUs via Detroit can be read as follows: between Amsterdam and 
Cincinnati 89 indirect flights per week are offered by SkyTeam via Detroit. 
These 89 flights are comparable to 28,7 direct flights from Amsterdam to 
Cincinnati. 
Table 1. Quality indices, frequency per week and connectivity units (CNU’s), Amsterdam-
Cincinnati, 3rd week of May 2005 
 
Origin Hub Destination Alliance 
Average 
Quality 
Index 
Frequency 
per Week CNU/week 
Amsterdam -- Cincinnati SkyTeam 1,00 7 7,0 
Amsterdam Atlanta Cincinnati SkyTeam 0,42 14 5,9 
 Boston  SkyTeam 0,49 7 3,4 
 Paris CDG  SkyTeam 0,35 47 16,6 
 Detroit  SkyTeam 0,32 89 28,7 
 New York Newark  SkyTeam 0,40 46 18,2 
 Rome FCO  SkyTeam 0,38 7 2,6 
 Frankfurt  SkyTeam 0,47 7 3,3 
 Washington Dulles  SkyTeam 0,46 14 6,4 
 Houston  SkyTeam 0,35 7 2,4 
 New York JFK  SkyTeam 0,37 28 10,5 
 Memphis  SkyTeam 0,19 7 1,4 
 Minneapolis  SkyTeam 0,30 41 12,1 
 Chicago O’Hare  SkyTeam 0,39 14 5,4 
   Star 0,31 7 2,2 
 Philadelphia  Star 0,30 6 1,8 
 Montreal Dorval  SkyTeam 0,58 7 4,1 
 Toronto  SkyTeam 0,41 6 2,5 
TOTAL    0,37 361,00 134,50 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Data and classifications 
The authors used OAG flight schedules in the third week of May in 
2003, 2004 and 2005 (OAG 2005). Direct connections are directly available 
from the OAG database. Indirect connections have been constructed using an 
algorithm, which identifies for each incoming flight at an airport the number 
of outgoing flights that connect to it. The algorithm takes into account 
minimum connection times and puts a limit on the maximum connecting 
time and routing factor. Next, the NETSCAN model assigns to each direct 
and indirect connection a quality index, ranging between 0 and 1. 
Within the NETSCAN model, only online connections are considered as 
viable connections. In other words, the transfer between two flights has to 
take place between flights of the same airline or global airline alliance. For 
the years 2004 and 2005, we distinguish three global airline alliances: 
OneWorld, SkyTeam and Star. For the year 2003, the authors distinguish an 
additional alliance, Wings (KLM/Northwest), which submerged into 
SkyTeam in 2004. 
The analysis considers the connectivity between airports in northwest 
Europe and airports in the US. Northwest Europe is defined as Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxemburg (Benelux), the UK, Ireland, France and 
Germany. Only westbound connections (from northwest Europe to the US) 
have been taken into account. The return connections have not been 
considered in the analysis. It is important to note that the total market 
between northwest Europe and the US has been analysed. This means that 
indirect connections in this market can be provided by hubs within the 
geographical boundaries of this market (Amsterdam and Frankfurt, for 
example) but also by hubs located outside the geographical boundaries of 
this market (Madrid, for example).  
Furthermore, we make a distinction between primary, secondary and 
tertiary airports. European primary airports are the four largest airports: 
London Heathrow, Paris CDG, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. The American 
primary airports are the major gateways: Chicago O’Hare, Atlanta, Los 
Angeles and New York JFK. Secondary airports are all those airports having 
a direct connection from northwest Europe to the US in May 2005 (Munich, 
Minneapolis, for example). Tertiary airports are all other airports. 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONNECTIVITY 
Recovery and stabilisation 
The total number of direct flights between northwest Europe and the US 
increased about 21 percent between May 2003 and May 2005 (Table 2). For 
a large part, this growth took place between 2003 and 2004 (+17%). This 
period can be considered as a recovering period from the downturn after 9/11 
and the economic recession. The period between 2004 and 2005 
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demonstrates lower growth rates (+4%), which is much closer to the long-
term growth rates in international air transport. The same holds true for 
indirect connectivity (with a transfer at a hub). The number of indirect 
connections increased at a higher rate between 2003 and 2005 (+41%) than  
direct connectivity. 
The highest growth percentages can be found at the only primary airport 
in the Benelux (Schiphol), both with respect to direct and indirect 
connectivity. The authors later show that this has been largely the 
consequence of the integration of KLM into the SkyTeam alliance after the 
Air France-KLM merger. The primary airport of the UK and Ireland region 
(London Heathrow) experienced modest growth levels in terms of the 
number of direct frequencies. This is partly the result of the capacity 
shortages at the airport. The crisis in the global air transport sector and the 
orientation of Heathrow towards North America had eased the capacity 
shortages at the airport. Not surprisingly, the number of flights increased 
between 2003 and 2004. Between 2004 and 2005, the growth percentages 
were again reduced to zero. No more flights could be accommodated at the 
airport. The growth in the number of indirect connections was mainly due to 
better/more connections via other hubs to the US. 
In addition, Table 2 demonstrates the demand threshold, which airlines 
need in order to serve transatlantic routes. Only between primary/secondary 
European airports on the one hand and primary/secondary American airports 
on the other, demand levels are sufficiently large to justify direct 
connections. Tertiary European airports depend on European hub airports for 
their connections to the US. 
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Changing connectivity levels of European Airports 
To what extent did the position of individual European airports change 
with respect direct and indirect connectivity levels? Figure 1 shows some 
remarkable changes between 2003 and 2005. 
First, the primary and secondary airports show a recovery of the industry 
crisis between 2003 and 2004 (see also the previous section). Yet, at most of 
the European airports, growth rates were considerably lower between 2004 
and 2005. Some airports even demonstrated negative growth rates, such as 
Munich, Manchester and Düsseldorf. 
  CNU % growth 
  2003 2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2003-2005 
Initial 
origin 
Type of 
origin Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Benelux 
primary 
(AMS) 185 2790 14 78 8 17 24 109 
 secondary 43 1296 10 10 1 6 11 17 
 tertiary . 150  39  28  78 
UK and 
Ireland 
primary 
(LHR) 501 3698 14 37 0 1 14 38 
 secondary 354 7245 17 30 9 10 28 43 
 tertiary . 605  21  8  30 
France 
primary 
(CDG) 257 4662 18 30 3 5 22 36 
 secondary 9 1324 -19 12 0 16 -19 29 
 tertiary . 501  10  19  31 
Germany
primary 
(FRA) 267 5144 18 28 1 3 20 32 
 secondary 81 4819 36 33 7 -1 46 31 
 tertiary . 1355  7  12  19 
Total  1696 33590 17 32 4 7 21 41 
Table 2. Direct and indirect connectivity units (CNU) from primary, secondary 
and tertiary airports in northwest Europe to the US, 2003-20051 
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Figure 1. Total connectivity (direct + indirect) from primary and secondary NW-
European airports, 2003-2005 
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Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
Secondly, Amsterdam Schiphol is an exception to the more modest 
growth rates in the 2004-2005 period. How can we understand the continued 
growth at Schiphol? The explanation for this observation can be found in the 
Air France-KLM merger and the entry of KLM to the SkyTeam alliance. In 
2003, KLM was still part of the Wings alliance (KLM/Northwest). Indirect 
connections to the US were primarily generated by the Wings alliance via 
the Northwest hubs in the US (Detroit, Minneapolis and Memphis) and to a 
lesser extent by other alliances. Our NETSCAN model did not consider 
connections between, for example, KLM and Delta as viable connections 
since both carriers did not belong to the same alliance in 2003. 
The entry of Northwest and KLM to the SkyTeam alliance resulted in an 
integration of the Wings and SkyTeam networks. From 2004 on, the 
NETSCAN model considers the connections between, for example, the 
KLM and Delta flights at Schiphol, as online, viable connections. As Figure 
2a illustrates for Amsterdam, the impact of the network integration between 
2003 and 2004 is substantial. A good example is Houston. In 2003, the KLM 
flights to Houston did not connect to the domestic flights of Continental. 
From 2004 on (due to the Air France-KLM merger and the integration of 
KLM into SkyTeam) the NETSCAN model considers these connections as 
online and thus viable connections. As a result, the number of connections 
from Amsterdam via Houston to the rest of the US increased substantially. 
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In addition, new services and frequencies between the US and 
Amsterdam were added against the background of the SkyTeam extension 
and the Air France-KLM merger. Delta Airlines, for example, started to 
operate a daily frequency between its Cincinnati hub and the new SkyTeam 
hub in Amsterdam during the period 2003 and 2004. The same holds true for 
the growth in frequencies between Amsterdam and Atlanta in 2005. KLM 
started a daily frequency to Atlanta in 2005, which brought the total 
SkyTeam frequency to a twice-daily level. Figure 2b shows that, as a result 
of the additional daily frequency, the indirect connectivity between 
Amsterdam and the US via Atlanta was boosted. 
Figure 2a. Absolute growth of indirect connectivity (CNU) from Amsterdam via North-
American and European hubs to the US, 2003-2004 
 
 
Figure 2b. Absolute growth of indirect connectivity (CNU) from Amsterdam via North-
American and European hubs to the US, 2004-2005 
 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Finally, London Heathrow lost its third position to Amsterdam in the 
ranking of best-connected airports to the US (Figure 1). Whereas Amsterdam 
benefited from the integration of KLM into the Air France and SkyTeam 
network, Heathrow suffered from its capacity limitations. The capacity 
problems at Heathrow make it extremely difficult for the OneWorld and 
other alliances to increase frequencies or add new routes. 
HUB CONNECTIVITY 
The dominance of American hubs 
Until now, we have only considered direct and indirect connectivity. 
These measures give a good indication of the direct and indirect service 
levels available at the respective airports to the consumers. However, they do 
not measure the competitive position of an airport in the connecting market. 
Hence, we have analysed the hub connectivity of airports in the transatlantic 
market. 
Figure 3a. Hub connectivity on the market between NW-Europe and the US per hub in 
2005, North-American hubs 
 
 Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Figure 3b. Hub connectivity on the market between NW-Europe and the USA per hub in 
2005, European hubs  
 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
 
With regard to hub connectivity on the market between northwest 
Europe and the US, American airports have a dominant position (Figures 3a 
& b). Moreover, they have further strengthened their position between 2003 
and 2005. In 2003, almost 65% of the hub connections were generated at 
American airports. In 2005, this percentage had increased to 69%. The share 
of northwest European airports in total hub connectivity decreased from 30% 
in 2003 to 27% in 2005. The dominance of American hubs is largely the 
consequence of the difference in market size between the US and northwest 
Europe. The number of tertiary airports in the US is much higher than the 
number of tertiary airports in northwest Europe. Since tertiary American 
airports are only served by American hubs and not by European airports, the 
hub connectivity of American airports is essentially larger than the hub 
connectivity of northwest European airports. 
Chicago O’Hare and Atlanta can be considered as superhubs. The two 
hubs offered more hub connections than all northwest European hubs 
together. Both airports are the main home bases of large hub-and-spoke 
carriers and their alliance: Chicago for both American (OneWorld) and 
United (Star), Atlanta for Delta (SkyTeam). In addition to the superhubs, a 
group of second tier hubs can be identified, on both the European and 
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American side. In Europe, the primary airports London Heathrow, Frankfurt, 
Paris CDG and Amsterdam belong to this group of second tier airports. 
Further down the hierarchy, the only European airport that plays a 
substantial role in the connecting market is Lufthansa’s secondary hub 
Munich. Other airports have too little direct flights to the US or are too 
decentrally located in a geographical sense (such as Madrid or Milan 
Malpensa) to be competitive in the hub market. London Gatwick was an 
important hub to the US during the nineties, but lost its position after British 
Airways decided to dehub Gatwick (Burghouwt, 2005). 
On the American side, the number of second tier airports is larger. In 
particular, the airports that are a hub for SkyTeam are important second tier 
airports (Newark, Detroit, Cincinnati, and Houston). In addition, the Dallas 
DFW (OneWorld) and Washington Dulles and Philadelphia (Star) can be 
considered as second tier airports. The fact that the SkyTeam hubs seem to 
dominate the hub market is in line with the development of alliance market 
shares, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Changing alliance patterns 
The global airline alliances fully dominated the connecting market 
between northwest Europe and the US during the period of analysis. Only 
1% of the hub connectivity was generated by airlines not belonging to a 
global airline alliance. SkyTeam had the largest share in the number of hub 
connections (CNUs) in 2004 and 2005, followed by Star and OneWorld. In 
addition, the share of SkyTeam increased from 30% in 2003 to 46% in 2005, 
because of the integration of the Wings networks (KLM/Northwest) into 
SkyTeam. Because of the integration, Star lost its first position in the hub 
market to SkyTeam. Because of the synergy effects due to network 
integration, the share of SkyTeam in 2004 (44%) was substantially larger 
than the sum of the market shares of Wings (9%) and SkyTeam (30%) in 
2003. 
American hubs dominate the market in all alliances. Within SkyTeam, 
the share of American hubs was 73% in 2005. Within the networks of all of 
the alliances, the share of European hubs decreased and the share of 
American hubs increased. The same holds true for all other alliances. A 
small percentage of the hub connectivity of the alliances is generated at hubs 
outside northwest Europe or the US. Examples of such hubs are Madrid 
(Oneworld), Mexico (SkyTeam) and Toronto Lester (Star). 
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Table 3. Share of regions in total hub connectivity of alliance and share of alliance in total 
hub-connectivity, 2003-2005 
   2003 2004 2005 
% in total alliance ONEWORLD NW-Europe 34 30 31 
  US 57 62 62 
  Rest of the world 9 8 8 
% in grand total   23 21 20 
% in total alliance SKY TEAM NW-Europe 19 21 22 
  US 74 73 73 
  Rest of the world 7 6 5 
% in grand total   30 44 46 
% in total alliance STAR NW-Europe 30 27 28 
  US 59 64 63 
  Rest of the world 11 9 10 
% in grand total   36 34 33 
% in total alliance WINGS NW-Europe 34 -- -- 
  US 61 -- -- 
  Rest of the world 5 -- -- 
% in grand total   9 -- -- 
% in total alliance NON-ALLIANCE NW-Europe 0 0 0 
  US 0 0 0 
  Rest of the world 100 100 100 
% in grand total   1 1 1 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
 
Not surprisingly, the growth of European hubs has been on average 
lower than the growth of American hubs (Figure 4). In the US, Cincinnati, 
Houston, New York JFK, Minneapolis and Boston demonstrated high 
growth rates in particular. In Europe, only Amsterdam Schiphol experienced 
growth levels comparable to its American counterparts. In contrast to 
Frankfurt, Munich and Heathrow, this growth continued in between 2004 
and 2005. 
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Figure 4. Percent  growth in hub-connectivity, NW-Europe to US for selected airports,              
2003-2005 
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Developments within alliances 
As the authors showed earlier, growth at the SkyTeam hubs can be 
attributed largely to extension of the SkyTeam alliance and the growth of 
transatlantic frequencies to the European hubs Amsterdam Schiphol and 
Paris CDG. In addition, Air France-KLM increased feeder frequencies 
between Schiphol and the French hinterland. Paris CDG is more orientated 
towards France and Germany for attracting transfer passengers. There is a 
clear distinction in geographical market segmentation between the two hubs. 
Paris CDG’s feeder network in northwest Europe is primarily located in 
France, whereas the feeder network of Amsterdam is more focused on the 
UK and has in general less CNUs per feeder airport (Figure 5 and 
Appendix). 
   Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Figure 5 Connectivity units between NW-European regions and the US via selected 
European hubs, 2003-2005 
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Within the SkyTeam alliance, Minneapolis (Northwest) seems to start to 
play a less important role. Although the number of frequencies between 
European origins remained equal between 2004 and 2005, the hub 
connectivity of Minneapolis decreased because of fewer frequencies to the 
American domestic market. This conclusion is in line with the strategy of 
Northwest to convert Detroit into the primary intercontinental hub and to 
give Minneapolis a secondary, continental role. After the large-scale 
expansion of Detroit Metro, the airport is much better equipped to facilitate 
and the hub system of Northwest, which requires high peak-hour capacity 
and short connecting times. 
The Star alliance has two primary European hubs for the market 
between northwest Europe and the US: Frankfurt and Munich. The 
secondary hub of Star, Copenhagen, only plays a marginal role for the 
market under consideration. At Frankfurt, growth percentages were moderate 
due to severe capacity restrictions at the airport. In contrast to Amsterdam, 
Paris CDG and Heathrow, both hubs are largely orientated towards the large 
German domestic market for attracting feeder traffic (see Appendix). In 
2005, the percentage of hub connections with a German origin was 72% at 
Frankfurt and 74% at Munich. In comparison, for Amsterdam, the 
percentage of hub connections originating in Benelux was only 14%, for 
Paris CDG (French origins) 43% and for Heathrow (UK/Ireland origins) 
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45% (see Appendix). Outside Germany, there are not many airports in 
northwest Europe used as feeder airports by Frankfurt and Munich. 
Finally, OneWorld has little opportunities to grow on the northern part 
of the transatlantic market as far as London Heathrow is concerned. 
Heathrow is capacity restricted while the Gatwick hub strategy did not prove 
to be a success at the end of the 1990s. As the Appendix shows, connectivity 
is mostly generated at the large British and European airports. On the 
American side, Chicago O’Hare saw its position as a hub decline to some 
extent between 2004 and 2005. Chicago is a dual hub of both American 
(OneWorld) and United (Star). Possibly, the implementation of the rolling 
hub concept by American may be the cause of the slightly declining hub 
position between 2004 and 2005. American depeaked its hub operation in 
order to ease congestion problems at the airport. Depeaking might have had 
a negative impact on connectivity levels at O’Hare. 
 
Some first evidence on concentration levels after the Air France/KLM 
merger 
Until now, the impact of the Air France-KLM merger and the 
integration of Wings into SkyTeam seem to have had only positive network 
impacts. But what about the impact of these developments on market 
concentration levels at the transatlantic market? The number of global airline 
alliances decreased from four to three. 
Although market concentration is somewhat outside the scope of the 
paper, the results of our model allow us to compute average market 
concentration levels in terms of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index1 (HHI) at 
the route level. Figure 6 shows the average HHI between 2003 and 2005 for 
a selection of European airports. The HHI was defined at the airport-pair 
level. Input for the HHI is the share of an alliance in the total number of 
direct and indirect connectivity units per airport pair. 
The Air France-KLM merger and the integration of Wings into 
SkyTeam have had a market concentration increasing impact. Both at 
Amsterdam and Paris CDG, concentration levels increased substantially. 
This conclusion holds for all route types, but is stronger for primary and 
secondary American destinations than for tertiary destinations. However, 
concentration levels at the (thin) tertiary destinations were already high in 
2003. In addition, the concentration increasing effects are larger for 
Amsterdam than for Paris CDG. At the same time, concentration levels at 
three other major northwest European airports remained virtually stable 
between 2003 and 2005. 
Increasing concentration levels generally allow airlines to set higher 
fares (see for example, Borenstein, 1992). Hence, evaluation of the consumer 
                                                 
1 Sum of squared market shares.  
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welfare impacts of the Air France-KLM will have to take into account both 
the positive impacts of the enlargement of the network scope as well as 
potential impacts on airfares. Yet, this issue is outside the scope of this paper 
and should be dealt with in future research. 
Figure 6. Average Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) per airport pair between selected 
European airports and primary, secondary and tertiary US destinations, 2003-2005 
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HHI tertiary American destinations
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  Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the authors argued that the measurement of network 
performance in hub-and-spoke systems should take into account the quantity 
and quality of both direct and indirect connections. The NETSCAN model 
quantifies the potential direct and indirect connectivity and scales the quality 
of these connections to the quality of a theoretical direct connection. As a 
result, direct and indirect connections (via hubs) are additive and can be 
compared. NETSCAN allows for an integrated analysis of the competitive 
position of airline/alliance networks, airports and regions. 
The authors applied NETSCAN to the network between northwest 
Europe and the US between 2003 and 2005. One of the most striking 
developments has certainly been the impact of the Air France-KLM merger 
on the competitive position of Amsterdam Schiphol and the SkyTeam 
alliance in general. Both the number of direct and indirect travel 
opportunities for the passengers travelling from and via Schiphol increased 
at a higher rate than at the neighbouring European hub airports. On the one 
hand, the integration of Wings into SkyTeam resulted in a substantial 
increase in connecting opportunities at the hubs of the extended SkyTeam 
alliance. On the other hand, frequencies between Amsterdam and the new 
SkyTeam hubs as well as French secondary airports were increased and new 
services were initiated.  
Yet, the paper has also demonstrated some first signs of the potential 
impact of the Air France-KLM merger and the integration of Wings into 
SkyTeam on concentration levels in the transatlantic market. In particular, at 
the routes between Amsterdam/Paris and the primary and secondary 
American destinations, average concentration levels increased substantially. 
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In contrast, concentration levels between some other large European airports 
and the US remained virtually unchanged. Increasing concentration levels 
might eventually result in higher airfares for consumers. The positive 
welfare effects of the Air France-KLM merger in terms of a large network 
scope will have to be evaluated against potential upward effects on fare 
levels. Yet, this issue will have to be addressed in future research. 
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APPENDIX  
Annex A Indirect connectivity (CNU per week) of Northwest-European airports via 
selected, major European airports, 2005 
 
 
 
 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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